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INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen a tremendous growth in litigation,
particularly constitutional litigation, concerning public education. Along with the well-publicized cases concerning such areas
as students' rights,' financing, 2 and desegregation, 3 there has
developed a group of cases concerning the alleged federal constitutional right of public school teachers to teach what they desire in their individual classrooms, despite the contrary wishes of
their administrative superiors, school boards, or legislatures.
I Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1962, University
of Pennsylvania.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2
See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
3
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
" See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502
F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Ahern v. Board of Educ.
School Dist. of Grand Island, 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir.), affg 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d
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One such case involved a teacher's insisting on teaching Darwinian evolution to a high school biology class despite a state
statute prohibiting such teaching in the state's public schools; 5
another involved a high school English teacher's insisting on assigning Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Welcome to the Monkey House to her
English class over the objection of her principal and associate
6
superintendent.
This Article is devoted to an analysis of the theory, recently
espoused by some of these cases and the related legal literature,
that public school teachers have a federal constitutional right to
determine what they teach despite the contrary views of
superiors vested with decision making authority under state law.7

359 (1st Cir. 1969); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Iowa 1972); Calvin v. Rupp, 334 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd, 471 F.2d
1346 (8th Cir. 1973); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Opinion
of the Justices, 337 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1975). Cf. Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 491
F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Moore v. School Bd.,
364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp.
1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lindros v. Governing Bd. of Torrance Unified School Dist., 9
Cal. 3d 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); Celestine v. Lafayette Parish School Bd., 284 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Board of Educ.
v. Rockaway Township Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.J. Super. 564, 295 A.2d 380 (1972). See also
Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 998 (1972); Manarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
These cases have also been the subject of scholarly writing. See S. GOLDSTEIN, LAW
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 71-110 (1974); Kutner, The Freedom of Academic Freedom: A Legal
Dilemma, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 168 (1971); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The
High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1032 (1971);
O'Neil, Libraries,Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. Cir. L. REv. 209, 244-45 (1973);
Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841
[hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Constitutional Rights]; Note, Academic Freedom in the
Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176 (1973). For more generalized
discussion of the issues involved in these cases, see ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (L.
Joughin ed. 1969); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 593-626
(1970); R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
THE UNITED STATES (1955); Goldstein, Academic Freedom, Its Meaning and Underl)ing
Premises as Seen Through the American Experience, 11 ISRAEL L. REv. 52 (1976); Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404
ANNALS 140 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, ANNALS]; Wright, The Constitution
on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969); Note, Developments in the Law: Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
5 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Cf. Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of
Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
6 Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
Legal aspects of the factual situations discussed in this Article other than those
involving the Constitution are beyond the scope of this Article. The reader should be
aware, however, that other issues do exist. For example, a teacher's use of classroom
materials over the objections of his administrative superiors might raise the question
whether such action constitutes cause for dismissal under the relevant state law. See, e.g.,
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The analysis will begin with an examination of a number of
older constitutional decisions relevant to the issue.
II.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND

"ExT1AMURAL" ACTIVITIES OF EDUCATORS

A. Loyalty Oath Cases
The anti-Communist movement in the United States after
the Second World War resulted in federal and state activity,
including the passage of loyalty oath requirements, aimed at
purging public agencies and private associations or activities of
members involved with "subversive organizations." Public education, particularly higher education, was a prime target of such
governmental activity. In a number of cases the Supreme Court
held these measures to be unconstitutional, primarily on the
grounds that the legislative terms used were too vague or would
punish "innocent" as well as "knowing" membership in subversive organizations. 9 Many of these cases involved statutes covering other public employees in addition to teachers and were
decided without reference to any special constitutional status of
teachers, even when the plaintiffs themselves were college or
university professors.'0 But language in other majority opinLindros v. Governing Bd. of Torrance Unified School Dist., 9 Cal. 3d 524, 510 P.2d
361, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). See also notes 142-43 infra &
accompanying text on the issue of the relationship between teacher collective bargaining
and curricular determinations.
8
See generally R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956); Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty
Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963). The federal government instituted loyalty
tests as a condition for employment for federal civil servants, government contractors
and their employees, labor leaders, seamen, and others. States prescribed similar tests
for teachers, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, social workers, librarians, veterinarians, and
state and local civil servants. R. BROWN, supra at 21-118, 164-82. One state even went so
far as to require loyalty oaths of professional boxers and wrestlers. Id. 118.
'See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
1"See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Similarly, where the Court upheld an anti-subversion statute
directed at teachers in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), Justice Black's
forceful dissent did not rely on a special status for teachers. Id. at 496-97. See also
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770, 774 (1972) (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in separate opinions).
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ions," concurrences, 1 2 and dissents' 3 suggests that the involvement of university professors provided an academic freedom
element which heightened the interests in expression and association otherwise present in the cases.
For example, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,' 4 in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a New York State loyalty oath requirement for teachers, Justice Brennan, after discussing the unconstitutional vagueness of the oath in terms not peculiarly applicable to teachers, added the following:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.... The classroom
is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
'1 See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 60 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
12 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 261-62 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter, a former law professor, was the principal exponent of academic freedom
in the cases in which he participated. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) Justice
Frankfurter dissented from a majority decision that relied in part on his own language
in Wieman v. Updegraff,supra, to invalidate a state statute compelling every teacher in a
state supported school or college to file an annual affidavit listing organizations to
which he had belonged or regularly contributed within the past five years. Justice
Frankfurter felt compelled in his dissent to state that he is "one who has strong views
against crude intrusions by the state into the atmosphere of creative freedom in which
alone the spirit and mind of a teacher can fruitfully function." 364 U.S. at 490. He
went on to conclude, however, that in his judgment the particular statute involved in
this case was valid:
If I dissent from the Court's disposition in these cases [which he did], it is not
that I put a low value on academic freedom. [Citing his concurrences in
Wieman and Sweezy.] It is because that very freedom, in its most creative
reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the careful and discriminating
selection of teachers. This process of selection is an intricate affair, a matter of
fine judgment, and if it is to be informed, it must be based upon a comprehensive range of information. Id. at 495-96.
13 See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
But note Justice Black's dissent in the same case which does not rely on any special
status for teachers. Id. at 496. In Justice Black's vigorous and lengthy dissent in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), there is also a brief reference to a special
status for academicians. Id. at 144.
14385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than
5
through any kind of authoritative selection."'

In analyzing the significance of this language and of similar
language in other cases, it must first be recognized that these
cases generally involved higher education, and that the discussions of education, such as that quoted above, seem to be predicated on archetypes of higher education, not lower public education. The significance of the differences between higher and
lower education for purposes of the issues examined in this Article will be developed below. 1 6 It should be noted here, however,
that.-historically higher and lower education in the United States
have been viewed as quite different processes:
To oversimplify, education can be divided, for
analytical purposes, into two models: prescriptive and
analytic. In the prescriptive model, information and accepted truths are furnished to a theoretically passive,
absorbent student. The teacher's role is to convey these
truths rather than to create new wisdom. Both teacher
and student appear almost as automatons. Analytic
education, however, signifies the examination of data
and values in a way that involves the student and
teacher as active participants in the search for truth.
While these polar models represent only a theoretical
paradigm that can never exist in pure form, we have
traditionally conceived of pre-college public education
as essentially prescriptive, and college and post-grad7
uate studies as analytic.'
Related to these different pedagogical models is the traditional
view of the different goals of higher and lower education. Historically, the inculcating of values has been viewed as a greater
component of lower education than of higher education. Again,
this aspect of education is crucial to an analysis of the central
issues of this Article and thus will be discussed at greater length
below. 8
rsid. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
16 See text accompanying notes 158-66 infra.
17 Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 612, 614 (1970). See also, Note, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81

HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1049-50 (1968).

" See text accompanying notes 158-66, 184-200 infra.
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Even in the context of higher education it is difficult to
characterize the language in Keyishian quoted above. The fact
that similar cases were decided by the Court on similar grounds,
only some of which contain such language about education, suggests that the language should be viewed as unnecessary dictum.
On the other hand, it appears that at least some Justices considered it relevant that teachers and education were involved in a
particular case and took this into account in the process of determining the balance between the governmental intrusion on
freedom of speech and association and the governmental interest furthered by the legislation. The ambiguous and erratic
use of such language, however, has produced agreement, even
among commentators who favor the concept of a constitutional
right of academic freedom, that these cases created no such
right.' 9
The fact that almost none of the cases in which this language was used truly involved academic freedom reinforces this
view. Interference with academic freedom entails governmental
intrusion into the teaching or research activities of professors.
Instead, these cases involved attempted governmental regulation of political or social activities of professors and other em20
ployees that were unrelated to their professional activities.
The concept that professors, or more generally teachers, have
a unique academic freedom right to engage in extramural political and social activities that are unrelated to their professional activities of teaching and research does not seem to be
well founded in policy, even aside from issues concerning the
21
constitutional status of such a doctrine.

1

9See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 610; Van Alstyne, ANNALS, supra note 4, at
143-45.
21 See generally cases cited in note 9 supra. The only exception to this norm is the
case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) which involved the constitutionality of the questioning of an individual by state authorities concerning, among other
things, the content of a guest lecture he had delivered to a class at the state university.
The unique nature of Sweezy in this regard does not seem to have had any significant
influence on the further development of the law in this area. Rather, Sweezy and its
language concerning academic freedom seem to have been assimilated into the line of
cases discussed above that do not involve governmental intrusion into teaching or research activities. See cases cited in note 9 supra, decided after Sweezy; T. EMERSON, supra
note 4, at 602-10; Van Alstyne, ANNALS, supra note 4, at 143 n.6.
21 The following discussion is taken in part from Goldstein, supra note 4, which
examines more fully the theoretical structure of the doctrine of academic freedom at
the university level.
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B. Modern Development of Academic Freedom
Although some aspects of intellectual freedom embodied in
the concept of academic freedom find their sources in antiquity,
the modern development of the doctrine of academic freedom is
derived largely from the nineteenth century German concepts of
lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit-freedom of teaching and learning.
The basic concepts were that a university faculty member was
free to teach what and how he thought best, and a student was
free to learn what and how he thought best, with university
authorities or external agencies, such as government, imposing
only the most minimal restraints on either teacher or student.
This German concept of academic freedom underwent a
number of changes when it crossed the Atlantic. The principal
change was the development of the concept that a professor was
protected by academic freedom from sanction by his university
or by external agencies not only for conduct connected with his
professional roles as teacher and scholar, but also for his extramural conduct associated with his role as "private" citizen.
Indeed, despite its lack of precedent in the German doctrine, the
protection of a professor against sanctions for extramural activities has become in the United States probably the predominant aspect of academic freedom, at least at the university level.
This surprising occurrence has developed primarily because
of the historical accident that attacks on university professors by
government, as exemplified in the cases discussed above, have
focused almost exclusively on the professors' extramural, rather
than professional, conduct. As a defense against such attacks, the
academic profession seized upon the available tool of academic
freedom because there was an absence of a more generalized
civil libertarian doctrine that would restrict a government's interference in the speech or conduct of its citizens or an employer's
interference in the non-work-related activities of his employee.
Historically, the principal professional organization dedicated to the protection of academic freedom at American colleges and universitites has been the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP).2 2 The 1915 Declaration of Princi-

22The author served as General Counsel of the AAUP from 1972-1974. Since
many of the ideas contained in this Article may be in conflict with some AAUP positions, it is imperative to emphasize that the views expressed herein are the personal
views of the author and in no way reflect those of the AAUP.
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ples issued by the AAUP at its founding clearly demonstrated
its concerns:
The term "academic freedom" has traditionally had
two applications-to the freedom of the teacher and to
that of the student, Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit. It need
scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the
subject of this report is that of the teacher. Academic
freedom in this sense comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching
within the university or college; and freedom of
extra-mural utterance and action. The first of these is
almost everywhere so safeguarded that the dangers of
its infringement are slight. It may therefore be disregarded in this report. The second and third phases of
academic freedom are closely related, and are often not
distinguished. The third, however, has an importance
of its own, since of late it has perhaps more frequently
been the occasion of difficulties and controversies than
has the question of academic freedom of intra-academic
23
teaching.
The present AAUP view of academic freedom, as set forth in its
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,2 4 is
fundamentally the same as that stated in the 1915 Declaration.
The development of the doctrine that academic freedom
includes rights of extramural expression has also been aided by
the judicial statements in the cases discussed above. Yet, despite
this history and judicial language, the argument that academic
freedom gives to professors a unique protection for their nonwork-related activities does not appear to be well founded. A
plausible doctrine of a unique freedom for teachers would
necessarily be linked to some unique qualities of teachers. To put
it simply, why should a university chemistry professor enjoy
greater rights to engage in political activities free from restraints imposed by his employer or government than are en23 AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, The 1915 Declaration of
Principles, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 4, at 157.
24 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, The 1940 Statement of Princi_ples on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 1-4
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Statement]. The 1940 Statement was a joint product'
of the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges and was endorsed by both
organizations in 1941. In subsequent years it has been endorsed by nearly 100 other
organizations involved with higher education.
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joyed by other citizens and employees? I have not been able to
conceive of an adequate justification for such a result. Nor have
I discovered such a justification in the literature on academic
freedom which, for the most part, postulates this unique status
for extramural faculty expression without attempting to justify
it.
One such attempt has, however, been made by Professor
Fritz Machlup:
Against the restrictionist view [that academic freedom should be limited to professionally related
activities], let us recall that almost all great thinkers,
originators, and developers of great ideas were polyhistors, not narrow specialists. Will anyone seriously contend that Leibnitz should have "specialized" instead of
freely holding forth on philosophy, mathematics, law
and theology?...
It is not only difficult but dangerous to define a
scholar's "area" of competence, because such an area
ought not to be a static but a continually enlarging one.
Interdisciplinary thinking and discussion, on problems
for which perhaps no one has a satisfactory answer, is
precisely what is most needed in our time, it not at all
times. Progress is chiefly made by those who continually
press forward to enlarge their areas of competence and
to question all certified competences.
All this, perhaps, will be thought by many to be
beside the point, for what the limitists nowadays really
have in mind when they object to extentions of
academic freedom beyond the area of competence is the
scholar's taking part in public discussions of current
political problems. For several centuries it was the area
of religious controversy which many wanted to declare
as "out of bounds"; now it is chiefly the area of social,
economic, and political controversies from which the
professors are to be scared away. And for professors
not in the fields of social, economic or political science,
this would be achieved through the area-of-competence
clause in the definition of academic freedom.2 5
While the rhetoric of this statement is attractive, particularly
2 Machlup,

On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academi-c-Freedom, in

FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note

4, at 177, 194-95.
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to a professor, it is unpersuasive as a justification for academic
freedom protection for non-professionally-related activity. Of
course, if a faculty member is professionally involved in more
than one field, his activity in each field will be professionally
related. Also, the determination of what, in a given case is professionally related and not extramural conduct may be difficult.
Yet this hardly seems a sufficient reason to provide special
academic freedom protection to all extramural activities of professors or other teachers.26
Professor Machlup, himself, recognizes that his argument in
the first two quoted paragraphs does not address the real issue.
The real issue is the freedom of an academician to express himself where he clearly is not acting in a professionally related
area-for example, the chemistry professor engaging in political
activity. The essence of Professor Machlup's position is that such
activity should not be declared "out of bounds." Yet, that is not
the question. Rather, the question is whether or not chemistry
professors ought to have greater rights of political expression
than those enjoyed by other employees and citizens. To conclude
that they should not, is not to declare such activity out of
bounds. Rather it is only to shift the focus to the proper issue of
the rights of all citizens and employees vis-a-vis their governments and employers to be free from restraints on political or
27
other non-employment-related speech or conduct.
26 It has also been suggested that academic freedom of teachers, including presumably special rights of extramural expression or association, may be justified as a valuable
fringe benefit of a low-paid but socially important profession. See Jones, The American
Concept of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 4, at 224,
233. One might concede the social importance of teaching and the poorly paid status of
teachers. One might also concede that teachers should therefore receive fringe benefits
in addition to their salaries, either because fringe benefits serve as an incentive to enter
into and remain in teaching or because the fringe benefits are in some sense deserved.
It is clear, however, that the special status generally attributed to academic freedom
cannot be based on this fringe benefit rationale. If viewed as a mere fringe benefit,
academic freedom could be traded for higher salaries, better medical plans, or even
greater use of a secretary. There would be no obligation on either a teacher or an
educational institution to continue this fringe benefit. This is a far cry from the classic
AAUP statement that "[a]cademic freedom is essential" to the "purposes" of institutions
of higher education that "are conducted for the common good and not to further the
interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole." 1940 Statement,
supra note 24, at 2. Indeed, it was partly the fear that academic freedom might become
a negotiable item if professors engaged in collective bargaining under the auspices of
other organizations that induced the AAUP to engage in greater collective bargaining
activities itself. For discussion of other possible justifications for academic freedom for
teaching and research in higher education, see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 65-76. See also
note 2118
infra and text accompanying notes 131-56 infra.
7
The question of the proper relationship between citizens and their government
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C. The FirstAmendment Rights of Citizens
Applied to ExtramuralActivities of Teachers
The above analysis is consistent with the anti-subversion or
loyalty oath cases that were decided without special reference to
academic freedom or rights of teachers.2 8 It is also consistent
with another series of cases concerning teachers' activities not
directly connected with their teaching. In these latter cases, in
complete contrast to the cases discussed above in which teacher
involvement added weight to the freedom of speech side of the
balance, the fact that teachers were involved was argued to justify greater governmental restrictions on freedom of speech. Examples of such cases are the recent decisions of Pickeringv. Board
of Education,29 James v. Board of Education,30 and Russo v. Central
School District.3 1
In Pickering a local school board attempted to dismiss a
teacher for sending to a local newspaper a letter that was critical
of the way in which the school board and the district superintendent of schools had handled past proposals to raise revenues for
the schools. In asserting that this dismissal violated his first
amendment rights of freedom of speech and the press, Pickering
did not assert any peculiar rights as a teacher. To the contrary,
he relied upon the well-accepted doctrine that public employment may not be unjustifiably conditioned on the employee's
relinquishment of his constitutional rights as a citizen,3 2 and he
asserted that his status as a teacher did not provide a basis for
depriving him of those constitutional rights. The school board,
on the other hand, asserted that Pickering's status as a teacher
was relevant and in fact justified restricting his rights as a citizen.
In rejecting the school board's argument, the Court once again
reasserted the basic constitutional proposition that government
employment, or other governmental benefits, may not unjustifiably be conditioned on the relinquishment of one's general

in regard to their political activities involves basic issues of civil and political rights,
about which much has been written. For a more specific discussion of the relationship
between employers and employees regarding political or other non-employment-related
speech
or conduct, see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 59-65.
28
See text accompanying notes 8-21 supra.
29 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
30 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
31469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
32 391 U.S. at 568. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).

1304

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:1293

constitutional rights as a citizen. 33

In apparent contrast to Pickering, both James and Russo
involved teacher conduct which took place in the classroom. This
contrast, however, is only superficial. As in Pickering, these cases
both involved the assertion by teachers of constitutional rights
generally belonging to citizens, and not rights peculiar to
teachers. In James a teacher was dismissed for wearing a black
armband to school on a moratorium day to express his disapproval of American involvement in the war in Vietnam. Russo
involved a teacher who was dismissed for failure to lead or join
the daily flag salute in school. In both cases the teachers expressly disavowed any attempt on their parts to teach their students anything. Rather they were asserting rights applicable to
all citizens; they just happened to be serving as teachers when
the time arrived for the assertion of such rights. Mr. James wore
the armband to school on moratorium day because it was the
designated day and school was in session. He would have worn
the same armband if he had worked in a store or office. 34 Simi-

larly, Ms. Russo would have refused to salute the flag at any flag
salute ceremony.
As astutely noted by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the problem in both James and Russo, was to
ascertain, and ultimately assess, the sometimes conflicting interests of the state on the one hand, in maintaining and promoting the discipline necessary to the
proper functioning of schools, and the interest of the
teacher, on the other, freely to exercise fundamental
rights of expression and belief guaranteed by the Bill of
35

Rights.

In other words, the issue was whether the needs of the school
justified restricting the rights that James and Russo otherwise
had as citizens. Of course, in deciding this issue the fact that
James and Russo were teachers exercising these rights in school.
within the view of their possibly impressionable students was

33 391 U.S. at 568, 572-73.
3' For a full discussion of the history of the James incident, see Annals of Law: A
Scrap of Black Cloth, THE NEW YORKER, June 17, 1974, at 37.
35 Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 932 (1973). For an excellent discussion of the issues involved in this assessment
process see Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalRights, supra note 4, at 850-54.
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quite relevant.3 6 The key construct, however, was the determina-

tion of whether the needs of the school justified restricting the
rights of its teachers as citizens. Cases presenting a sharp contrast to this construct-cases with which this article is primarily

concerned-are those in which teachers assert rights to teach
that are unique to them as teachers.
III.

THE LEGACY OF MEYER AND PIERCE

In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska37 held that
a state could not constitutionally punish a private school teacher
36 An important issue in this regard is the extent to which the traditional view that
teachers serve as role models for students is still considered a legitimate basis for restricting teacher activity that would otherwise be beyond the legitimate concern of an
employer. It was not too long ago that school boards had rules whereby female public
school teachers who married were automatically dismissed. See generally E. BOLMEiER,
SEX LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 96-117 (1975); R. HAMILTON & P. MORT,
THE LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 399-400 (2d ed. 1959). A court has also upheld the
discharge of a tenured teacher on the statutory grounds of "incompetency" based on
the fact that she was employed part time as a waitress, and on occasion as a bartender,
in her husband's bar, and that she had taken, in the bar and in the presence of several
students an occasional drink of beer, served beer to customers, rolled dice with customers for drinks, and taught customers how to play a pin-ball machine. Horosko v. Mount
Pleasant Township School Dist., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553
(1939). In so holding, the court stated:
It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct himself
in such a way as to command the respect and good will of the community,
though one result of the choice of a teacher's vocation may be to deprive him
of the same freedom of action enjoyed by persons in other vocations.
Educators have always regarded the example set by the teacher as of great
importance, particularly in the education of the children in the lower grades
such as those attending the school in which this teacher had been employed; it
was a country school with eighteen pupils classifying into eight grades.
Id. at 371, 6 A.2d at 868.
Currently, a more general legal trend to confine legitimate employer interest in
employee activities to those that are directly work related, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2 to e-3 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to e-3 (Supp. II, 1972); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 63-65, has restricted to a greater extent the ability of school
authorities to control teacher extramural conduct in this way. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973);
Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Burton v. Cascade School Dist.,
353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), Cf. Wiethoff v. St. Veronica School, 48 Mich. App.
163, 210 N.W.2d 108 (1973). The concept of the teacher as a role model, however,
continues to be upheld by many courts as a basis for school authority restrictions on
teacher extramural activities. See, e.g., Pordum v. Board of Regents, 491 F.2d 1281 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530 (D.
Mass. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974); Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855 (D.
Miss. 1973), aff'd, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1408 (1976);
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491
F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); In re Grossman, 127 N.J. Super.
13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974). See also note 118 infra.
3 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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for violating a state statute that prohibited the teaching of any
language other than English to a child who had not completed
the eighth grade.3 8 The defendant, a teacher in a Lutheran
parochial school, had been convicted of teaching German to a
ten-year old child in violation of the statute.
In overturning the conviction, the majority of the Court
recognized the legitimacy of Nebraska's desire "to promote civic
development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals ....-39 The Court also recognized the validity of the state supreme court's finding that "the
foreign born population [of Nebraska] is very large, that certain
communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are
thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful
type ....40 In short, the Court recognized the legitimacy of an
integrationist policy. It held, however, that the means employed to effectuate the policy violated Meyer's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children," 41 both of which were protected liberties under the
fourteenth amendment.4 2
38 The Nebraska Supreme Court had interpreted the statute as only applying to
modern, foreign languages. The statute also required that the teaching of other subjects
be in the English language throughout a child's school career. Although this section of
the statute was not directly involved in this case, the Court's opinion might be construed
to suggest that it viewed it as constitutionally permissible. See id. at 402; note 50 infra &
accompanying text. With the rise in recent years of a movement for greater bilingual
education, the wisdom, it not the constitutionality, of such provisions have come under
increasing attack. See generally S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 692-718.
262 U.S. at 401.
439
0

1d.
41Id. at 400.
42 There were arguably two other grounds present in the facts of Meyer, and its

companion cases, Bartels v. Iowa, Bohning v. Ohio, Pohl v. Ohio, and Nebraska Dist. of
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, all at 262 U.S. 404 (1923), that might have
provided alternative bases for the Court's result. First, there is reason to believe that the
Nebraska statute in Meyer, as well as similar statutes of other states, was specifically
aimed at the German-American community as a part of the anti-German feeling
aroused by the First World War, thus possibly giving rise to an equal protection interpretation of the decision. These statutes were enacted in midwestern states which
contained substantial German minority communities. In Meyer as well as in two of its
companion cases, Bartels v. Iowa and Bohning v. Ohio, both at 262 U.S. 404 (1923), the
statutes were enforced against people teaching German in Lutheran parochial schools.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's construction of its statute as not forbidding the teaching of "dead" languages such as Latin, classical Greek, or Hebrew may also have had
the effect of disfavoring German Lutherans as compared to other religious groups.
Finally, an explicit anti-German language provision was contained in the Ohio statute
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Meyer, a substantive due process case typical of its time, included a persuasive dissent by Justice Holmes. He said simply
that because the aim of the legislation was legitimate and the
means of attempting to effectuate such aims were reasonable,
the statute did not violate the due process clause.43
With the demise of the substantive due process theory on
which the case was based, and particularly in today's post-Brown
v. Board of Education44 integrationist constitutional environment,
one might expect Meyer to have little present precedential
vitality. 45 Yet, that has not been true. Meyer and its 1925 sibling,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 46 survived the decline of substantive due

process and have blossomed in the renaissance of the substantive
due process doctrine in recent years.4 7 This has occurred, however, in a way that is very significant for our purposes. Meyer has
generally come to be viewed as a parental rights case, and as
involved in Bohning v. Ohio, 262 U.S. 404 (1923). This Ohio statute required that
instruction in all courses be in English, but freely permitted the teaching of foreign
languages in all grades, "provided, that the German language shall not be taught below
the eighth grade in any of the elementary schools of this State." Id. at 410 n.2; see also
id. at 412-13 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Yet, the Court clearly did not decide Meyer and its companion cases on an equal
protection basis. Even the Ohio statute was stricken down without any reliance on its
singling out of the German language. Except for the Ohio statute, the Court would
have had to base an equal protection decision on a determination of the legislature's
unconstitutional "motivation," a most difficult ground on which to rest constiutional
adjudication. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Rev. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
Nor did the Court decide Meyer and its companion cases on the ground that the
statutes, at least as applied, violated the parties' free exercise of religion, despite the
general religious overtones of the situation and the fact that the parties involved all
were affiliated with parochial schools. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), discussed in text accompanying notes 51-53 infra, which followed Meyer and also
involved a parochial school. However, Pierce v. Hill Military Academy, the companion case
to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, decided in the same opinion, did not involve a parochial
school, and the fact that it was decided solely on the authority of Meyer reenforces the
fact that Meyer was not decided on a religious ground. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972).
43 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44 397 U.S. 483 (1954).
45 Even when compared with other substantive due process cases, the opinion is
poorly written; the Court analogizes this relatively simple statute to a Platonic vision in
which all children are involuntarily removed from their parents at birth and raised by
the state. Id. at 401-02.
46 268 U.S. 510 (1925), discussed in text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
47 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965); id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213-14, 231-34 (1972). See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
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such, to stand for the proposition that parents have certain constitutional rights to raise their children as they desire,48 including
in this particular case, the right to hire a teacher to teach the
children a foreign language before they have completed the
eighth grade. An economic due process right of teachers to practice their profession without governmental restriction seems to
have gone the way of other economic due process rights.
Meyer is not authority, however, for a right of public school
teachers to determine what they teach for a more fundamental
reason. Meyer did not address the issue of public school teachers
determining what they teach over the objections of superiors.
Although the statute in Meyer included both public and private
schools in its prohibitions on teaching languages, the defendant
in Meyer was convicted of teaching German in a private school
and the Court clearly decided the case on that basis. The Court
stated:
The power of the State to compel attendance at
some school and to make reasonable regulations for all
schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a
curriculum for institutions which it supports. .

.

. Our

concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court.4 9
The meaning of the quoted passage is quite apparent. The
following issues were viewed by the Court as not being involved
in Meyer: (a) the right of the state to compel attendance at some
school, public or private; (b) the right of the state to make
"reasonable regulations" for all schools, public or private; and (c)
the right of the state to "prescribe a curriculum" for public
schools. What was involved in Meyer was the right of the state to
"prescribe a curriculum" for private schools, and this right was
rejected by the Court, at least with regard to the particular curriculum prescription involved in the case.48 See cases cited note 47 supra; Tribe, supra note 45, at 34-38, 42-44. But cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 53-73
infra. For the possible conflict between such a parental right and a right of teachers to
determine what they teach, see note 94 infra.
49 262 U.S. at 402.
50 The statement in the text is based on a narrow construction of the Court's lan.guage that certain issues are not "questioned" or subject to "challenge." Id. These are
taken simply as statements that these issues are not involved in the case. The language,
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The limitation of the Meyer holding to private schools, as
well as its emphasis on parental rights, was reinforced by the
Supreme Court's decision only two years later in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.5 1 In Pierce the Court invalidated an Oregon statute
which required children between the ages of eight and sixteen to
attend public schools. The court referred in language almost
identical to that used in Meyer to the legitimacy of the state's
reasonably regulating all schools, public and private, but concluded that "[u]nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska ...the Act
of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. '52 The preceding sentence constitutes almost the entire opinion in Pierce, aside from the statement of
facts and history of the litigation, and indeed, that was all the
Court need have stated. Meyer held that parents have a constitutional right to have their children taught German in a private
school. A fortiori, parents have a constitutional right to send
their children to a private school, subject to reasonable state
regulations.
To emphasize that Meyer is clearly limited by its own terms
to private schools would seem to belabor the obvious. Yet, the
obvious was not so clear to Mr. Justice Fortas when he wrote the
majority opinion in Epperson v. Arkansas.53 Epperson, a 1969 counterpart to the celebrated Scopes "monkey trial" case of 1927, "
involved a 1928 Arkansas anti-evolution statute which made it
unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university "to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals" or "to adopt or use in
any such institution a textbook that teaches" this theory. 55 Violation was made a misdemeanor, subjecting the violator to a fine of
up to $500, and to dismissal from his position. The Arkansas
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a
56
two sentence per curiam opinion.
Towever, could be read to suggest that not only are these not questioned or ch@iIengecT
in this case, but the state's power to act is so dear as not to be subject to question or
challenge. On such a reading, the language would stand as authority, albeit dictum, in
support of a state's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports.
51268
U.S. 510 (1925).
52
Id.at 534-35.
53 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
51 Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.363 (1927).
'5Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98-99 & n.3 (1968).
56
Upon the principal issue, that of constitutionality, the court holds ...
[the statute] is a valid exercise of the state's power to specify the curriculum in
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The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas,
struck down the statute as violative of the first amendment prohibition of the establishment of religion on the ground that the
enactment of the statute was motivated by religious considerations. The opinion and decision on this point are quite unsatisfactory. 57 Of more immediate concern here, however, is Justice Fortas' dictum concerning teachers' rights in the classroom:
[A]s early as 1923, the Court [in Meyer] did not hesitate
to condemn under the Due Process Clause "arbitrary"
restrictions upon the freedom of teachers to teach and
of students to learn. In that year, the Court, in an opinion by Justice McReynolds, held unconstitutional an Act
of the State of Nebraska making it a crime to teach any
subject in any language other than English to pupils
who had not passed the eighth grade. The State's purpose in enacting the law was to promote civic cohesiveness by encouraging the learning of English and to
combat the "baneful effect" of permitting foreigners to
rear and educate their children in the language of the
parents' native land. The Court recognized these purposes, and it acknowledged the State's power to prescribe the school curriculum, but it held that these were
not adequate to support the restriction upon the liberty
of teacher and pupil. The challenged statute, it held,
unconstitutionally interfered with the right of the individual, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, to engage in any of the common occupations of life and to
acquire useful knowledge.
For purposes of the present case, we need not reenter the difficult terrain which the Court, in 1923,
traversed without apparent misgivings. . . . Today's
problem is capable of resolution in the narrower terms
of the First Amendment's prohibition of laws respecting
its public schools. The court expresses no opinion on the question whether the
Act prohibits any explanation of the theory of evolution or merely prohibits
teaching that the theory is true; the answer not being necessary to a decision in
the case, and the issue not having been rasied.
242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
5' First, the Court, for very sound reasons, has rarely struck down a statute, otherwise valid, because of the legislative motivation in enacting it. See Ely, supra note 42, at
1315-27; cf. Brest, supra note 42. Second, the religious motivation of the Arkansas legislature was not so evident. Indeed, in terms of affirmative evidence of motivation which
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an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free ex58
ercise thereof.
The preceding statement of Meyer contains many difficulties. One notes first that Justice Fortas discusses the case in terms
of" 'arbitrary' restrictions upon the freedom of teachers to teach
and of students to learn," ignoring completely the parental
rights aspect of the decision. This is in complete contrast to the
generally accepted current understanding of Meyer; indeed, in
his emphasis on teachers' rights "to engage in any of the common occupations of life," Justice Fortas seems to resurrect longdiscarded notions of economic due process. Even more significantly, the quoted statement completely ignores the fact that
Meyer involved teaching in a private school5 9 and that the Court
in Meyer contrasted the State's unchallenged power to prescribe a
curriculum for public schools with the State's unconstitutional
action in restricting teaching in private schools. Moreover, while
ignoring the private school context of Meyer, Justice Fortas misuses the language about prescribing a school curriculum for public schools 6° in asserting the clearly erroneous proposition that
Meyer held that the state could not restrict the teaching of
foreign languages in the very same schools for which it could
generally prescribe the curriculum. Finally, the statement that
could be found within the statute itself, the Court relied not on the Arkansas statute

involved in Epperson, but on the Tennessee statute involved in Scopes which contained
explicit religious references not present in the Arkansas statute, 393 U.S. at 108-09. In
addition, the Court never adequately answered Justice Black's contention, in his concurring opinion, that it was quite possible that the motivation for the statute was "merely
that it would be best to remove this controversial subject from [the] schools." 393 U.S.
at 112-13. Finally, the Court never adequately explained the constitutional vice of
legislative enactments motivated by religious concerns. It is surely not unconstitutional
for legislators to vote in favor of such legislation as civil rights laws, or American withdrawal from foreign wars, because they are motivated by religious convictions. While
there may be differences between these examples and the situation in Epperson, see
Tribe, supra note 47, at 18-25, it is hard to understand the Court's failure even to
discuss the problem.
58 393 U.S. at 105-06 (footnotes and citations omitted).
59 This distinction had been recognized and relied upon by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in its opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute in Scopes
v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111-15, 289 S.W. 363, 364-66 (1927). See also the opinion of
the Arkansas Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322
(1967), revd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The citation of Meyer in disregard of its private school
context was repeated by Justice Fortas in his opinion for the Court in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07, 511-12 (1969).
60 Compare the use of similar language by the Arkansas Supreme Court in its opinion in Epperson v. Arkansas, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), revd, 393 U.S. 97
(1962).
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the Court traversed the terrain in Meyer "without apparent misgivings" ignores the significant dissent of Justice Holmes in that
61
case.
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the Epperson result on the
ground, not relied on at all in the majority opinion, that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not make
clear whether a teacher "is forbidden to mention Darwin's theory
at all or only free to discuss it as long as he refrains from contending that it is true. '6 2 In his concurring opinion, Justice Black
disagreed with both the establishment of religion basis for the
majority decision and its academic freedom dictum. On the later
point, he stated:
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to
teach school children takes with him into the classroom
a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic,
political or religious subjects that the school's managers
do not want discussed. . . . I question whether it is
absolutely certain, as the Court's opinion indicates, that
"academic freedom" permits a teacher to breach his
contractual agreement to teach only the subjects
desig63
him.
hired
who
authorities
school
the
by
nated
Justice Black's view is clearly based on the employee status
of a teacher who is thereby subject to the directions of his employers, the public school authorities. This is the distinction
drawn in Meyer between public and private schools. Yet, curiously enough, Justice Black never takes issue with the majority
on its reading of Meyer. Rather he limits himself to this affirmative statement of his position, and ignores the Meyer decision.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however, squarely relies on a teacher's rights theory:
61 The quoted discussion of Meyer also confuses the two provisions of the Nebraska
statute: one forbidding the instruction in general subjects in any language other than
English throughout a student's school career and the other forbidding the teaching of a
foreign language to a student who has not completed the eighth grade. See note 38
supra & accompanying text.
62 393 U.S. at 112. As an alternative to reversing the judgment below on this
ground, Justice Black would have remanded the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court
for a clarification of its opinion. He also expressed doubt as to the justiciability of the
case since the state was apparently making no effort to enforce the statute. Cf. Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
63 393 U.S. at 114. See also Justice Black's reference to Meyer in his dissent ifi Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969).

1976]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SCHOOL TEACHERS

The States are most assuredly free "to choose their
own curriculums for their own schools." A state is entirely free, for example, to decide that the only foreign
language to be taught in its public school system shall be
Spanish. But would a State be constitutionally free to
punish a teacher for letting his students know that other
languages are also spoken in the world? I think not.
It is one thing for a State to determine that "the
subject of higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be included in its public school
curriculum. It is quite another thing for a State to make
it a criminal offense for a public school teacher so much
as to mention the very existence of an entire system of
respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I
think, would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of
free communication contained in the First Amendment,
and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has said that the statute before us may or may not be just such a law. The
result, as MR. JUSTICE BLACK points out, is that "a
teacher cannot know whether he is forbidden to mention Darwin's theory at all." Since I believe that no State
could constitutionally forbid a teacher "to mention
Darwin's theory at all," and since Arkansas may, or may
not, have done just that, I conclude that the statute
before us is so vague as to be invalid under the Four64
teenth Amendment.
Many different strands of thought are intertwined in Justice
Stewart's short concurrence, and it is difficult to identify his
principal objection to a law that would forbid the teaching of the
existence of Darwin's theory of evolution. At its broadest, Justice
Stewart's opinion may be viewed as drawing a distinction between a state's right to prescribe the subjects (curriculum) to be
taught, but not the particular topics to be taught within each
subject area.6 5 Under this view, state authorities, other than the
classroom teacher, could determine whether or not biology is
taught. Once having determined that biology is to be taught,
64

393 U.S. at 115-16. Justice Harlan concurred in the decision and in that part of

the Court's opinion based on establishment of religion grounds. He expressly disassociated himself from the "possible implications" of the unnecessary teachers' rights
dictum.
Id. at 115.
65
Id. at 115-16.
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however, state authorities could not determine the specifics of
what is to be taught within the biology course, such as whether
or not the origin of man is to be part of the course. Yet it is clear
that school curricular subjects, such as biology, are not selfdefining. Biology could include or not include the topic of the
origin of man, and its inclusion must be determined by some
decision maker. A constitutional allocation of this decision to the
classroom teacher would have to rest on some basis other than a
general-specific dichotomy standing alone.
A close examination of Justice Stewart's opinion also reveals
that he does not seem to be relying on such a general-specific
dichotomy. Rather, he seems to be relying on a dichotomy
between "teaching" a "subject" and "mentioning" the "very existence of an entire system of respected human thought," coupled
with the existence of a criminal penalty for violating the Arkansas statute. To address the latter point first, the existence of the
criminal penalty in the Arkansas statute clearly seems to trouble
Justice Stewart, and his opinion may rest ultimately on a view
that the criminal penalty aspect of the statute is arbitrary and
therefore unconstitutional. It would certainly make more sense
for the penalty to consist only of the violator being fired, and,
indeed, that would seem to be the usual result of willful failures
to follow legitimate instructions of one's employers. On the other
hand, if in Mr. Justice Stewart's view the constitutional vice of
the statute consisted only of the criminal sanction, he should
have voted to strike down only that aspect of the statute, or, at
least, to remand the case to the Arkansas Supreme Court to
determine if the criminal sanction was severable from the rest of
67
the statute.
It would appear, therefore, that the key to Justice Stewart's
view is the dichotomy between teaching a subject and mentioning the existence of a body of knowledge. In analyzing his short
and cryptic statement of this dichotomy, the use of the contrasting terms "be taught" and "letting his students know" (or
66

Id .
67 Criminal penalties were also involved in the Meyer and Pierce statutes. In those

statutes, however, such penalties were more appropriate because the statutes in Meyer
and Pierce applied to private schools as well as to public schools, and the sanction of a
legally required discharge would not generally be expected in the case of private employment. It is, indeed, the restriction of the Arkansas statute to public schools that
creates the ,difficulty with the criminal sanction, because the discharge alternative was

available.
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"mention") is quite striking. 68 Mr. Justice Stewart's apparent
dichotomy between "mention" and "teach" might suggest that in
his view the statute is unconstitutional because it precludes a

teacher from mentioning things to people, who happen to be his
students, outside the context of his teaching. If this were true,
the case could be analyzed similarly to Pickering, Russo, and
James, discussed above. 6 9 This does not seem likely, however,
because all of Justice Stewart's examples and uses of language
seem to apply to a teacher talking with students in his role as
teacher.
More likely, Justice Stewart is suggesting that if the statute
were to forbid a teacher from even making the statement that
"there is a doctrine of Darwinian evolution," as distinguished
from teaching the doctrine, it would be irrational and therefore
unconstitutional. One does not have to postulate a special theory
of teachers' rights to hold that particular governmental action is
so irrational that it is unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's example of mentioning the existence of languages in the world other
than Spanish reinforces the impression that he is discussing unconstitutional irrationality.
The difficulty with this view, however, is that it does not fit
the facts of Epperson. The Arkansas statute does not use the
phrases "mention," "letting . . . know" or even "discuss," but
rather uses exclusively the word "teach." Justice Stewart was apparently led to the view that the statute possibly outlawed the
mentioning of Darwinian theory, as distinguished from teaching
it, by the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 71 For purposes of the issues with which we are now concerned, however,
the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court is clear. The Court
is talking only about teaching, and it is contrasting teaching the
facts of the doctrine with teaching that the doctrine is true. Re6 393 U.S. at 115-16. Justice Black also uses the term "mention," although he couples it with "discuss." Id. at 112. Such language, however, does not seem significant to
his point concerning the contrast between teaching the facts of a doctrine and teaching
that the doctrine is true. Id. at 111-12. See also text accompanying notes 71-73 infra;
Epperson
v. Arkansas, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
6
9See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.

T"See Gunther, The Supreme Court' 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,
20-24, 37-48 (1972). But cf. Tribe, supra note 45, at 5-10; Ely, supra note 41, at 1224-28;
Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
71 The two-sentence opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reproduced in note
56 supra.
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garding the former it introduces the word "explanation," but in
context that word appears to be synonymous with teaching the
facts of the doctrine. It does not seem to suggest the concept of
mentioning Darwinian theory outside a teaching context.
When the statute is viewed as prohibiting the teaching or
explanation of Darwinian theory, it is clearly not irrational. This
is true whether the statute's objective is viewed as the prohibition
of exposing students to Darwinian theory because the legislature
believed that the theory is wrong, or because, as stated by Justice
Black, the legislature thought that "it would be best to remove
this controversial subject from its schools. 7 2 On the first
hypothesis, it would seem to be rational to attempt to prevent
students from being exposed to erroneous doctrines as a means
of preventing the students from accepting them. On the second
hypothesis, it is also clearly not irrational to believe that the
introduction of a subject as emotional and controversial in Arkansas as Darwinian evolution would disrupt the school in an
undesirable way. Both of these views may possibly be wrong. But
they are not irrational.
Indeed, even if the statute were interpreted as prohibiting
the mere mentioning of Darwinian evolution, it would be difficult to conclude that it is irrational. Unlike Justice Stewart's
hypothetical statute that would proscribe the mentioning of the
existence of languages other than Spanish, a statute which would
never be enacted, the Arkansas statute was enacted precisely
because the theory of Darwinian evolution was not viewed by the
Arkansas population as a neutral fact, but rather as a value laden
and emotionally charged one. Restrictions on the teaching or
even mentioning of Darwinian evolution by teachers in the public schools do not truly raise issues of rationality, but rather of
legitimacy: legitimacy of means and ends.73 It is perhaps because
the real issues of legitimacy were not addressed in Epperson,
either in the dictum of the majority that misstated Meyers or in
Justice Stewart's cryptic concurrence, that Epperson has not been
significantly relied upon by the lower courts on the issue of a
teacher's right to control his classroom teaching.

393 U.S. at 112-13.
,1 See Tribe, supra note 47, at 5-10; Ely, supra note 42, at 1224-28.
72
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR

TEACHING CONTRARY TO PREFERENCES OF SUPERIORS

A. Recent Decisions Recognizing a Substantive Right of
Teachers to Determine What They Teach
The first of the recent decisions holding that a teacher does
have some type of a constitutional right to teach contrary to the
wishes of superior school authorities is that of the First Circuit in
Keefe v. Geanakos.14 Mr. Keefe, head of the English Department
and a teacher of English in a Massachusetts Public School System, distributed to each member of his twelfth grade English
class a copy of the September, 1969 Atlantic Monthly magazine,
and assigned the reading of the first article therein. This issue of
the Atlantic Monthly was the so-called education issue, and the
school authorities had supplied seventy-five copies of it to the
school. Keefe discussed the article and the recurring word
"motherfucker"; a word that the court euphemistically called "a
vulgar term for an incestuous son. 75 Keefe's discussion included
an explanation of the word's origin and context and the reasons
for its use in the article by the author. He stated that any student
who found the article personally distasteful could read an alternative one. The following evening, Keefe was called to a meeting
of the school committee where he was asked to defend his use of
the word in question. Following his explanation, a majority of
the committee asked him informally if he would agree not to use
the word again in the classroom. He replied that he could not in
good conscience agree, although he apparently did not use the
word again. At a subsequent meeting of the school committee,
Keefe was suspended and it was proposed that he be discharged.
Keefe thereupon brought this action in a federal district
court to enjoin his discharge. The district court refused his request for a preliminary injunction pedente lite. On appeal, the
First Circuit reversed the refusal of the preliminary injunction,
holding that the preliminary injunction should have been
granted as it was probable that the plaintiff would prevail on the
merits.
In so holding, the court noted that it had read the article in
74
75

418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).

Id. at 361.
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its entirety and found it "in no sense pornographic."7 6 The court
also referred approvingly to a description of the article "as a
valuable discussion of 'dissent, protest, radicalism and revolt.'77
With regard to the offending word itself, the court stated that
"we cannot think that it is unknown to many students in the last
year of high school .... No doubt its use genuinely offends the
parents of some of the students-therein, in part, lay its rele78
vancy to the article.
The court then stated that the central issue of the case
is whether a teacher may, for demonstrated educational
purposes, quote a "dirty" word currently used in order
to give special offense, or whether the shock is too great
for high school seniors to stand. If the answer were that
the students must be protected from such exposure, we
would fear for their future. We do not question the
good faith of the defendants in believing that some parents have been offended. With the greatest of respect to
such parents, their sensibilities
are not the full measure
79
of whav is proper education.
Accepting the conclusion of the district court that some public regulation of classroom speech inheres in every provision of
public education, the court held that the application of that principle in this case would demean any proper concept of education. It also expressed concern for the chilling effect that might
result from "such rigorous censorship."' " The court went on to
hold alternatively that it was "equally probable" that Keefe would
prevail on the issue that he had not received constitutionally
adequate notice that a discussion of the disputed article with his
class was forbidden conduct. 8 '
The opinion in Keefe was expanded upon by the district
court's decisi6n in Parducci v. Rutland, 2 which also involved an
action by a high school English teacher to enjoin her superiors
from firing her because she assigned allegedly offensive reading
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
7

9Id. at 361-62.
11 Id. at 362.
" Id. This conclusion was reached despite the uncontested fact that Keefe had refused to agree that he would not use the offensive word again in the classroom. For
further discussion of this issue, see note 123 infra.
2 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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material to her students. This case involved the assignment to an
eleventh grade English class of Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Welcome to
the Monkey House. On the morning following the assignment, the
teacher, Mrs. Parducci, was informed by the principal and school
system's associate superintendent of their displeasure with the
content of the Vonnegut story, which they described as "literary
garbage," and with the story's "philosophy," which they interpreted as condoning, if not encouraging, the "killing off of elderly people and free sex."' 83 They also expressed concern over
the fact that three of Parducci's students had asked to be excused
from the assignment and that several parents had complained to
the school. Finally they told her not to teach the story in any of
her classes.
Parducci responded that she was bewildered by their interpretation of the story, that she still thought it to be a good
literary work, and that while not desiring to cause any trouble,
she felt that she had a professional obligation to teach the story.
She also reportedly stated to them that regardless of their counseling she "'would continue to teach the eleventh grade English
class at the Jeff Davis High School by the use of whatever
material'" she wanted "'and in whatever manner'" she thought
best.

84

As a consequence of this meeting, Parducci was dismissed by
the school board after a full hearing. The school board stated
that the basis for its action was her assignment of materials which
had a "disruptive" effect on the school, and her refusal to follow
"the counseling and advice of the school principal."8 5 It also
explicitly noted that one of the bases of her dismissal was her
"insubordination" in stating that she would continue to disregard
86
the counseling of the principal and associate superintendent.
In discussing plaintiff's assertion that her firing violated her
first amendment "right to academic freedom," the court first
noted that the fact that "teachers are entitled to First Amendment freedoms is an issue no longer in dispute," and that a
teacher's first amendment rights "are unaffected by the presence
or absence of tenure under state law."187 The court then observed
83
84

d.at 353-54.

Id.at 354.

5

8 1d.
86

Id.

8

Id.at 354.
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that although academic freedom is not an enumerated first
amendment right, the Supreme Court has indicated8 8 that the
right to teach and to inquire is fundamental to a democratic
society, and that the classroom is a market place of ideas. Yet the
court acknowledged a competing interest of the state in shielding
impressionable minds from extreme propagandism in the classroom. Finding the work in question not obscene, and therefore
not inappropriate reading for high school juniors, and concluding that the assignment was not shown to have created a significant "disruption" of the educational process under the standards
articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District"9 , the court held that Parducci's dismissal was an impermissible invasion of her first amendment right to academic
freedom."' The district court, as in Keefe, then went on to hold
alternatively that Parducci's due process rights had also been
violated because she had not been given prior notice that the
conduct for which she was punished was prohibited. 9 1
These two decisions were the first attempts to create a
theory of constitutional protection of a public school teacher's
choice of teaching material. The courts never adequately explained, however, the basis for such a doctrine, and their reasoning, such as it is, appears quite weak. The issue as stated
by Keefe-whether the use of the "dirty" word would be too great
a shock for the students to bear-fails to pose the basic question
who, or what agency, is the decider of what is taught in a public
school classroom. It may be conceded, in the language of the
court, that the sensibilities of the parents "are not the full measure of what is proper education, ' 92 yet the issue is why the "sensibilities" of the classroom teacher, or the courts, are such a
measure.
The court's reference to the parents might be more apposite
if the legal action were brought by a group of parents to enjoin
the school board from effectuating one of its curricular decisions
88

The court referred to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See 316 F. Supp. at 355.
89393 U.S. 503 (1969).
9'316 F. Supp. at 355-56.
91 Id. at 357. In reaching this alternative holding the court completely ignored the
fact that one ground of the school board's action was plaintiff's "insubordination" in
insisting that she "'would continue to teach the eleventh grade English class.., by the
use of whatever material' she wanted 'and in whatever manner' she thought best" regardless of the views of her administrative superiors. Id. at 354. For further discussion
of this issue, see note 123 infra.
92418 F.2d at 362.
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that these parents felt was offensive or otherwise wrong.9 3 Yet,

that was not the posture of Keefe, in which the school board had
made a curricular decision that the teacher-plaintiff was challenging. Nowhere in the opinion does the court explain the
grounds on which a teacher's curricular decisions take constitutional precedence over those of the school board or9 4other school

authorities superior to the teacher under state law.
Equally unenlightening is the concern of both the Keefe and
Parduccicourts with the possible pornographic or obscene nature
of the material. 95 A concern with obscenity suggests, a construct
in which state authorities are interfering with the decisions of
private citizens about what they or their children should read.
This is the normal censorship problem, but it is not the correct
construct when dealing with public education. In the classrooms
involved in Keefe and Parducci, some public official-a person
9 See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974);
Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Hobolth v. Greenway, 52 Mich. App. 682,
218 N.W.2d 98 (1974); Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200
N.W.2d 90 (1972). Cf. Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So.2d 629 (1962); State cc
rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind.-31, 8 N.E. 708 (1886); State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson,
95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914); Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J.
Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (1971), dismissed on other grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 416, 288
A.2d 52 (1972); School Bd. Dist. v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909). See
generally S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 110-57.
94 The language of the court also exhibits an unwarranted antipathy to two concepts that have been traditionally and rightly accepted components of educational decision making in this country: the participation of parents in the process and the political
responsiveness of school authorities to the wishes of constituent groups. As exemplified
by the discussion of the Pierce and Meyer cases above, not only has parental participation
in the process of educating their children been viewed traditionally as legitimate, it has
at times been accorded special legal status. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914); Valent v. New
Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (1971), dismissed on other
grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 416, 288 A.2d 52 (1972); School Bd. Dist. v. Thompson, 24
Okla. 1, 103 P. 578 (1909).
Equally legitimate is the responsiveness of school authorities to wishes of constituent groups, such as parents or community organizations. Approximately 85 percent
of all local school board members are elected. See R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R.
MCPHEE, THE ORGANIZATION & CONTROL OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 164-70 (1965). See gen-

erally Cunningham, Community Power: Implicationsfor Education, in THE POLrrICs OF
EDUCATION INTHE LOCAL COMMUNITY (R. Cahill & S. Hencley, eds. 1964). This election
of school board members is indicative of the societal desire for popular lay control of
education, a desire that dates back to the 17th-century beginning of the American system of public education. See R. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM & R. MCPHEE, supra, at

157-60. See also text accompanying notes 139-43 infra. In recent years there has been an
increase in the demand for school authorities to be politically responsive. See generally
S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 801-23.
95418 F.2d at 361; 316 F. Supp. at 355-56.
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employed by state or holding a state office-must decide what
the students will be exposed to or taught by the school as part of
its educational process. The classroom teacher is one such person, as are the principals, assistant superintendents, and school
board members. A theory of a constitutional right of classroom
teachers to make such decisions cannot be based on a model in
which a classroom teacher is acting in a private citizen's capacity
and is being censored by governmental action initiated by school
administrators or school boards. Yet, neither Keefe nor Parducci
develops another theory to support their holdings on their issue.
The inadequacy of the reasoning in these cases is also demonstrated by the discussion in Parducci of the disruption limitations on its postulated doctrine of academic freedom in classroom teaching. 96 It bases this limitation on the guidelines of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.97 Tinker
involved an attempted prohibition by a school board of the wearing of black armbands to school by students as part of a general
moratorium protest against American involvement in the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court held that the prohibition violated
the first amendment rights of the students. Tinker and its deeper
meaning for the problem of this Article will be discussed in
further detail below. 9 8 At this point, however, it should be noted
that the court in Parducci attempted to apply the Tinker
disruption limitation on student rights to the case before it involving teacher classroom teaching.
This disruption limitation of Tinker has many problems,
both theoretical and practical, in its own context of student
expression.9 9 Whatever its status in that context, however, it is
clearly inappropriate to the situations in Parducci and Keefe. The
disruption test envisages a legitimate, ongoing event or series of
events that some outside force may disrupt by its speech or presence. The constitutional analysis, therefore, involves the determination of the proper balance between the expression rights of
the outside force and the disruptive effect of their exercise on
the ongoing event. Such an analysis has been employed by the
Supreme Court in determining the validity of governmental at96 316 F. Supp. at 356.
97 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
98 See text accompanying notes 190-207 infra.
99 See S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 293-355.
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tempts to prohibit demonstrations in close proximity to jails, 00
libraries, 0°' courthouses,' 0 2 and schools.' 0 3 Thus the disruption
test seeks to balance the free speech rights of an external agency
against the possible disruptive effects of this agency on an ongoing public function being conducted nearby.
As discussed above, such a construct is applicable to such
cases as Russo and James where a teacher is asserting citizen free
speech rights that school authorities claim are disrupting their
planned curriculum.' 0 4 But it is clearly inapplicable to cases like
Parducci and Keefe where the asserted teacher right is a right to
determine the components of the curriculum itself. It is not at all
helpful to talk about disruption of the classroom when the real
issue is the determination of who is to decide what is taught in
the classroom.
The disutility of the disruption test is demonstrated by the
difficulties confronted by the Parducci court in its attempt to use
the test. The court first shifted from the question of disruption
to the question whether the assigned material was "appropriate
reading for high school juniors" without explaining the connection between these two issues. When it again discussed the disruption test, the court stressed the lack of hostile student reaction to the material. Yet, surely the superior school authorities
have legitimate interests in the outcome of the classroom education process beyond the minimal one of protecting the classroom
from disruption. These authorities surely have an affirmative
interest in what is taught and in the effects of the teaching. The
lack of hostile student response may be just the reason not to
teach this material-material which the students seem all too
ready to accept. If the decision of the teacher regarding what is
taught is to be deemed superior to the decision of the other
school authorities as a matter of constitutional law, such a constitutional doctrine must rest on something more substantial
than the negative assertion that the students did not react adversely to the material.

100

Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

101 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
102
103

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104

(1972).
114 See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
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B. Decisions Questioningthe Existence of a
Substantive Right
The inadequacy of the reasoning of the Keefe and Parducci
courts supporting their alternative holdings on teacher control
of curriculum perhaps explains the difficulties encountered by
the First Circuit in its attempt to work with Keefe in the later
Mailloux series of cases, 1 15 and the rejection of the Keefe and
Parducci substantive-right doctrines by the Second Circuit in
10 6
PresidentsCouncil v. Community School Board.
Mailloux also involved an attempted dismissal by school authorities of a high school English teacher, this time an eleventh
grade teacher in Lawrence, Massachusetts. The teacher had led a
class discussion on that portion of a novel describing the difficulties encountered by a young country school teacher who attempted to intermingle the previously segregated seating of
boys and girls in a one-room school house. During the class
discussion, some of Mailloux's students stated that they thought
the parental protest against this seating change was ridiculous.
Mailloux then stated that other things today are just as ridiculous
and attempted to illustrate this point by a discussion of taboo
words. He wrote the word "goo" on the board and asked the
class to define it. When no one could do so, he stated that such a
word did not exist in English, but in another culture it could be a
taboo word. He then wrote the word "fuck" on the board and
asked for volunteers to define it. After a couple of minutes a boy
volunteer defined the word as "sexual intercourse." Mailloux,
without using the word orally, then stated: "'we have two words,
sexual intercourse, and this word on the board . . .one . . .is
acceptable by society ... the other is not accepted. It is a taboo
word.' ""' After a brief discussion of other aspects of taboos,
Mailloux went on to other matters. Neither the subject of taboo
words nor the word "fuck" appeared in the novel which was the
basic subject under consideration in the class.
After a parental complaint, and an investigation by the head
of the English department, Mailloux was suspended for seven
days with pay. He then engaged counsel and demanded a hearing before the school committee. After the hearing, he was dis105Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), after dismissal, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Mass.), affd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
106 457 F.2d 289, 293-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
0' 323 F. Supp. at 1388.
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missed on the grounds of "'conduct unbecoming a teacher'"
without further specification.'z 18 He then brought an action in
the Massachusetts federal district court for a temporary and
permanent injunction. After a two day hearing, the district
court, "regarding itself as bound by" the First
Circuit's opinion
9
in Keefe, granted a preliminary injunction.' 0
The school authorities appealed the granting of the preliminary injunction and requested a stay pending appeal. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied the stay and dismissed the appeal, but indicated that it was troubled by the case
and the possible implications of its opinion in Keefe. In its per
curiam opinion, the Court stated:
The court in no way regrets its decision in Keefe v.
Geanakos, but it did not intend thereby to do away with
what, to use an old-fashioned term, are considered the
proprieties, or to give carte blanche in the name of
academic freedom to conduct which can reasonably be
deemed both offensive and unnecessary to the accomplishment of educational objectives. Here, particularly,
such questions are matters of degree involving judgment on such factors as the age and sophistication of
students, relevance of the educational purpose, and
context and manner of presentation.
• . . [W]e see possible differences between an English
teacher discussing the content and meaning of a serious
piece of writing, and engaging in a discussion of social
mores in the use of language with the chalking of a
socially taboo word on the blackboard ....
We do suggest the fact that there was no regulation proscribing
the use of particular language does not alone compel a
conclusion that due process was violated."1 1
As the appellate court instructed, the district court entered
into a full trial on the merits. On the basis of the trial testimony
the district court found the following "facts":
1. The topic of taboo words had only a limited relevance to
the novel discussed in class, but it had a high degree of relevance
to the teaching of eleventh grade English.
1 8 Id. at 1389.
109 Id.

110 436 F.2d at 566 (citations omitted).
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2. The use of the word "fuck" is relevant to a discussion of
taboo words and illustrates how such words function.
3. Eleventh grade students are sufficiently sophisticated to
treat the word from a serious educational viewpoint. While at
first they may be surprised and self-conscious, they are not likely
to be embarrassed or offended by discussion of the word.
4. Mailloux's writing the word on the blackboard did not
have a disturbing effect. A class might be less disturbed to have
the word written than spoken.
5. Mailloux's calling on volunteers to explain the word was
in accord with his usual methodology and was reasonable here.
It avoided implicating anyone who did not want to participate.
6. The word "fuck" was in books in the school library."'
In what it viewed as a crucial issue, however, the court
found the expert testimony to be in conflict on whether or not
Mailloux's conduct was appropriate and reasonable under the
circumstances and served a serious educational purpose. Testimony from university educational experts generally supported
what Mailloux had done. But other expert witnesses, chiefly persons with experience as high school principals and the head of
the English department at Mailloux's school, testified that in
their opinions it was inappropriate to use the particular word in
question. Thus, although the court stated that the weight of the
evidence supported an ultimate finding that Mailloux's methods
served an educational purpose in that they were relevant to the
teaching of eleventh grade English and had professional endorsement from experts of significant standing, it could not find
on the basis of the evidence presented that the weight of opinion
in the teaching profession as a whole, or the weight of opinion
among English teachers as a whole, would support what Mailloux had done.
This factual setting was the basis for an extensive legal opinion. The court first stated the basic legal proposition that a
teacher has not only a constitutionally protected "civic right" to
freedom of speech both outside the schoolhouse (citing Pickering)
and inside the schoolhouse (citing Tinker), "but also some measure of academic freedom as to his in-classroom teaching" (citing
Keefe and Parducci)."2 The court added that the Keefe and
Parducci cases had "upheld two kinds of academic freedom":
.. 323 F. Supp. at 1389.

112Id. at 1390.
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the substantive right of a teacher to choose a teaching
method which in the court's view served a demonstrated
educational purpose; and the procedural right of a
teacher not to be discharged for the use of a teaching
method which was not proscribed by a regulation, and
as to which it was not proven that he should have
noticed that its use was prohibited."13
The court then held that Mailloux's conduct had not met
the substantive-right test of having "served a demonstrated educational purpose." It noted first that the teaching was not necessary to the subject matter in the sense that reference to Darwinian evolution might be thought necessary to the teaching of
biology, citing Justice Stewart's concurrence in Epperson. The two
main tests employed by the court, however, to determine
whether Mailloux's teaching served a demonstrated educational
purpose were whether the teaching served such a purpose according to the weight of opinion of the teaching profession, or
conclude that
alternatively, whether the court on its own could
4
purpose."
a
such
served
"plainly"
the teaching
The court concluded on the facts of the case that it could
not state that the weight of opinion in the teaching profession as
a whole or the weight of opinion among English teachers as a
whole would support Mailloux's conduct. Nor could the court
determine on its own that the teaching plainly served a demonstrated educational purpose. The court did find that Mailloux
had acted in good faith and stated that there was no evidence
that he had transcended a legitimate professional purpose. It
also read Keefe to indicate that use of the word "fuck" in class is
sometimes permissible, at least in the context of an assigned
reading. The court felt, however, that a teacher asking a mixed
class to define the word presented too great a risk of abuse for it
' 5
to find that such a method was 'plainly permissible." "
Thus, the court concluded that the facts of the case did not
come within its interpretation of the substantive academic freedom right upheld in Keefe and Parducci.The court considered at
length, however, whether Mailloux's conduct was protected by
substantive constitutional academic freedom rights beyond those
113Id. (emphasis supplied).
4
1 1d
1 15

at 1390-91.
1d. at 1391.
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already endorsed by Keefe and Parducci. It stated that it was "a
heretofore undecided question" whether a teacher had a substantive constitutional right to use a teaching method
that is not necessary for the proper instruction of his
class, that is not shown to be regarded by the weight of
opinion in his profession as permissible, that is not so
transparently proper that a court can without expert
testimony evaluate it as proper, but that is relevant to his
subject and students and, in the opinion of experts of significant standing, serves an educationalpurpose .... 116
The argument in support of such a right was said to be the
central rationale of academic freedom at the university level:
that academic freedom was necessary "in order to foster open
minds, creative imaginations, and adventurous spirits."' 1 7 The
court was quite uninformative about how academic freedom accomplishes these results"" and did not address the issue of why
such results, even if produced by academic freedom, are constitutionally compelled. The court, however, did not need to address these issues on the university level, because it concluded
that the doctrine of academic freedom on the university level
should not be applied to secondary education:
The secondary school more clearly than the college
or university acts in loco parentis with respect to minors.
It is closely governed by a school board selected by a
local community. The faculty does not have independent traditions, the broad discretion as to teaching
methods, nor usually the intellectual qualifications, of
university professors. Among secondary school teachers
116Id. (emphasis

11 7

supplied).

Id.

I1 The court apparently states that academic freedom accomplishes this result not
directly through enhancing the instructional process, cf. text accompanying notes
152-89 infra, but rather by the indirect route of creating teacher role models for students, which role models embody these virtues. This attempt to premise academic freedom on its effect in creating role models for emulation is, to the best of my knowledge,
unique. For a discussion of the more usual attempts to justify academic freedom in
teaching, see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 62-76; text accompanying notes 132-89 infra.
The Mailloux approach contrasts sharply with the more common view that the role
model status of teachers serves to justify restrictions on their freedom. See note 35
supra. Of course, the real issue is who is to decide what role model the schools want to
encourage. This unique role model concept suggested by the Mailloux court seems
completely incapable of supporting a doctrine of academic freedom as a matter of social
policy, let alone as a matter of constitutional law. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 62-65.
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there are often many persons with little experience.
Some teachers and most students have limited intellectual and emotional maturity. Most parents, students,
school boards, and members of the community usually
expect the secondary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching "the best that is known
and taught in the world," training by established techniques, and, to some extent at least, indoctrinating in
the mores of the surrounding society. While secondary
schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither
are they open forums in which mature adults, already
habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas on a level
of parity. Moreover, it cannot be accepted as a premise
that the student is voluntarily in the classroom and
willing to be exposed to a teaching method which,
though reasonable, is not approved by the school authorities or by the weight of professional opinion. A
secondary school student, unlike most college students,
is usually required to attend school classes, and may
have no choice as to his teacher. 119
On the basis of these considerations, the court concluded
that the substantive constitutional academic freedom right of
secondary school teachers extends only so far as already approved by Keefe and Parducci:to choice of materials that have the
support of the predominant opinion of the teaching profession
or the discipline to which the teacher in question belongs, or that
the court can itself conclude are plainly permissible. The court
went on to hold, however, that the attempted dismissal of Mailloux violated the constitutional procedural right recognized by
Keefe and Parducci-the right of a teacher not to be dismissed
for using a "reasonable" teaching method unless he or she has
been put on notice not to use that method.
The court's arguments for refusing to extend the substantive right of Keefe and Parducci, as it understood these cases, are
very persuasive. Indeed, they would seem to compel a rejection
of the substantive academic freedom rights of secondary school
teachers purportedly established by Keefe and Parducci. The
court itself states that substantive academic freedom is more of
a constitutional "interest" than a "right" and might be limited to
119

323 F. Supp. at 1392.
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freedom from discriminatory racial, religious, political, and like
measures, or clearly unreasonable action. 2 " In addition, although the district court otherwise adopts the proposition that
Keefe and Parducci uphold two separate constitutional rights, one
substantive and the other procedural, at one point in its opinion
narrowly construed
the court indicates that these cases might be
21
ground.'
procedural
the
on
only
as resting
Yet, despite the natural consequence of its own reasoning in
refusing to extend Keefe and Parducci, and its suggestions that
these cases could well be restricted even further by the force of
Supreme Court statements, 22 their own factual situations, and
the hints contained in the prior First Circuit opinion in Mailloux,
the district court refused to consider Keefe and Parducci as being
so limited. Rather, it attempted to restate the legal propositions it
saw in these cases in a comprehensible form, while at the same
time suggesting to the court of appeals ways of effectively retracting the substantive-right basis of the cases if it so desired.
Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not respond effectively to these opportunities. Rather, in a short per curiam opin120
The so-called constitutional right [of academic freedom of a secondary
school teacher regarding classroom material] is not absolute. It is akin to, and
may, indeed, be a species of, the right to freedom of speech which is embraced
by the concept of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Analytically, as distinguished from rhetorically, it is less a right than a
constitutionally-recognized interest. Clearly, the teacher's right must yield to
compelling public interests of greater constitutional significance. It may be that
it will be held by the Supreme Court that the teacher's academic right to liberty
in teaching methods in the classroom (unlike his civic right to freedom of
speech) is subject to state regulatory control which is not actuated by compelling public interests but which, in the judiciary's opinion is merely 'reasonable'.
[Citing Epperson and Tinker.] Indeed it has been suggested that state regulatory
control of the classroom is entitled to prevail unless the teacher bears the heavy
burden of proving that it has no rational justification, (See Mr. Justice Black
dissenting in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 519-521) 189 S.
Ct. 733, or is discriminatory on religious, racial, political, or like grounds. See
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S. Ct. 266.
Id. at 1391 n.4.
121 The court stated:
Nor is this case, like Keefe or Parducci, one where the court, from its own
evaluation of the teaching method used, may conclude that, even if the court
would not use the method, it is plainly permissible for others to use it, at least
in the absence of an express proscription.
Id. at 1390 (emphasis supplied). At this point the court added, in a footnote:
"[Plerhaps, though Keefe and Parducci do not say so, the school authorities there involved were constitutionally free by express proscription to forbid the assignment of
outside reading of magazine articles and novels of undoubted merit and propriety for
which22the teacher had not secured advance approval." Id. at 1390 n.3.
1 1d. at 1391 n.4.
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ion, it affirmed the district court's holding only on the procedural issue. With regard to the substantive right, the court
observed in dictum:
With all respect to the district court's sensitive effort to devise guidelines for weighing these circumstances, we suspect that any such formulation would
introduce more problems than it would resolve. At present we see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into
whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are
demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's
speech. Here, however, in weighing the findings below
we confess that we are not of one mind as to whether
fell within the protection of the First
plaintiff's conduct
23
Amendment.1

The difficulties encountered by the First Circuit in these
cases did not seem to affect the Second Circuit's disposition of a
similar problem in Presidents Council v. Community School Board.2 4
123 448 F.2d at 1243. Thus Mailloux ultimately was affirmed only on the procedural
issue, with Keefe and Parducci containing alternative holdings on this procedural
ground. See also Webb. v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D.
Iowa 1972). Although this Article is concerned with the substantive issue explored in
these cases and by the commentators, it should be noted that in both Keefe and Parducci
the teachers were dismissed not only after teaching the offensive material but also after
refusing to agree to conform their conduct in the future to the wishes of their
superiors. Parducci's "insubordination" in refusing to accept "the counseling and advice
of the school principal" was explicitly stated as a basis for the school board's action in
dismissing her. 316 F. Supp. at 354. Yet this was not discussed at all by the court when
it reached its conclusion that she had been dismissed without sufficient notice that her
conduct was prohibited.
The lack of a specific preexisting rule in these cases did not have the undesirable
effect of delegating the determination of what may be taught from one type of school
authority to another. It would appear that the same authorities who would be expected
to promulgate preexisting rules made the decisions in these cases. On the other hand
the lack of preexisting standards may undesirably deter teacher creativity as well as
enhance the possibility of arbitrary action by school authorities. See generally Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). These
factors do not seem, however, to compel a constitutional demand for explicit preexisting rules in this area unless the activity of classroom teaching is itself constitutionally
protected. This question returns us to the central problem of this Article. On the question of the need for preexisting standards governing student conduct in school, see
generally Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Hasson v.
Boothby, 318 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Mass. 1970).
124 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See also Adams v.
Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 n.2 (10th Cir. 1975); Birdwell v.
Hazelwood School Dist., 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mo.
1972); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Minarcini v. Strongsville
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That case involved the decision of a New York City Community
School Board to remove from all junior high school libraries in
the district all copies of Down These Mean Streets, an autobiographical account of a Puerto Rican youth growing up in Spanish
Harlem. The books were removed by a vote of the school board
after parents complained 2 5 that the book would have an adverse moral and psychological effect on their eleven- to fifteenyear-old children, principally because of obscenities and explicit sexual representations in the book. On the other hand, at trial
affidavits were introduced by psychologists, teachers, and children that the book would have no such effect.
Unlike the Keefe, Parducci,and Mailloux courts, however, the
Second Circuit upheld the action of the school board, without
discussing the value or harm of the book. The court viewed the
case as requiring determination of which authority has the responsibility, which inevitably must be lodged somewhere, of
selecting books for school libraries:
Since the Legislature of the State of New York has
by law determined that the responsibility for the selection of materials in the public school libraries in New
York City is to be vested in the Community School
Board, and the Commissioner of Education of that
State has defined the purposes of the public school library . . . we do not consider it appropriate for this
court to review either the wisdom or the efficacy of the
determinations of the Board. Our function is purely
one of constitutional adjudication on the facts and the
record before us: has the Board transgressed the first
amendment rights of the plaintiff teachers, parents, librarian and children....
After a careful review of the record before us and
the precedents we find no impingement upon any basic
constitutional values. Since we are dealing not with the
collection of a public book store but with the library of a
public junior high school, evidently some authorized
person or body has to make a determination as to what
the library collection will be. It is predictable that no
matter what choice of books may be made by whatever
City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp.
757 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
115 See generally note 94 supra.
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segment of academe, some other person or group may
well dissent. The ensuing shouts of book burning,
witch hunting and violation of academic freedom
hardly elevate this intramural
strife to first amendment
12 6
constitutional proportions.

The court went on to state that in this case, unlike Epperson,
there was no issue of religious motivation for the board's decision. The court also rejected the argument that the constitutional
prohibition against the government's banning books that are not
obscene means that school authorities may not remove nonobscene books from the public school library. Such an argument
equates the public school library, which has a function
as an adjunct to the educational venture, with the entrepreneur seller of books who has no comparable- responsibility. The public school library obviously does
not have to become the repository, at public expense,
for books which are deemed by the proper authorities
to be without merit either as works of art or science,
simply because they are not obscene within the
statute. 27
The court added that it did not see the relevance of Tinker to the
case at bar, and then it dealt explicitly with Keefe and Parducci:
To the extent that these cases hold that first amendment rights have been violated whenever a district court
disagrees with the judgment of school officials as to the
.propriety of material assigned by a teacher to students,
we are not in accord. In any event, both cases involved
the discharge of teachers with concomitant issues of
procedural due process which are not present
here and
28
therefore the cases are not controlling.
126

12 7
1

28

457 F.2d. at 291-92 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 292-93.
Id. at 293-94. The court in a footnote also observed that "[w]hile the First Cir-

cuit has indicated that it does not 'regret' its decision in Keefe v. Geanakos, supra, its
enthusiasm for intrusion into academic issues seems to be lessening," citing the two

opinions of the First Circuit in Mailloux. Id. at 294 n.7. Note that the Second Circuit
does not attempt to draw a distinction between teachers and librarians in distinguishing
Keefe and Parducci, although earlier in its opinion the court notes that the subjects discussed in the book "have not been placed off limits by the Board. A book has been
removed but the librarian has not been penalized, and the teacher is still free to discuss
the Barrio and its problems in the classroom." Id. at 292.
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), also
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The position of the Second Circuit in Presidents Council,
therefore, is based on the realization that in a public school,
unlike a private school, some public official or body-such as a
state legislature, local school board, superintendent, principal,
librarian, or teacher-must make book selections and other curricular determinations. Thus, the situation should not be viewed
in terms of a state authority censoring a teacher or librarian, but
rather in terms of whether the Constitution, in opposition to the
state sanctioned hierarchy, somehow makes the teacher or librarian the proper selector of a curriculum or books or otherwise restricts the ability of school authorities to make particular
curricular decisions. This Second Circuit position is so clearly
correct that it is difficult to understand how the Keefe and
Parducci courts, as well as many commentators, have not recognized its merit. 1 29 Even the district court in Mailloux, although
suggesting that a teacher's right to choose teaching methods is
more of a "constitutionally-recognized interest" than a "right"
and may be restricted more than a teacher's civic right to freedom of speech, persisted in speaking of the restriction of a
teacher's rights by governmental authorities as if the case involved governmental censorship of private conduct.'3 " Perhaps,
this persistent misunderstanding of the real problem has resulted from attempts by courts and commentators to reach their
desired results by casting the cases in the familiar mold of ceninvolved book selection in that the school board refused to purchase three novels which
the school's English teachers had recommended for classroom use. In upholding the
action of the school board and distinguishing Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux, the court
attempted to distinguish book purchasing from classroom teaching:
Factually the cited cases are distinguishable from the case at bar for the reason
that ... no teacher was discharged or threatened with discharge nor were any
members of the Strongsville teaching staff instructed not to discuss the novels
or utilize them as outside or supplemental reading. Additionally, the Court is
in complete accord with the underlying principles of plaintiffs' authority,
namely, the professional teacher's obligation to utilize individual teaching
methodology, which was not violated by the Board's action herein.
384 F. Supp. at 707.
In contrast, Professor O'Neil equates teachers and librarians for purposes of arguing that the Second Circuit is wrong in not recognizing that librarians have a constitutionally protected right of academic freedom. O'Neil, supra note 4, at 244-47. If public
school teachers have a constitutionally protected right to determine what they teach,
and this right also extends to public school librarians, the question necessarily arises as
to what other groups might also be said to enjoy such a right-for example, a programmer of a teaching machine; an author of an educational television program shown
in schools; a performer in such a program; the writer of a textbook used in school.
129 See text accompanying note 122 supra.
1' 323 F. Supp. at 1391 n.4.
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sorship. Or perhaps they have been genuinely confused. In
either event, proper analysis of these cases must begin with acceptance of the Second Circuit's position.
Viewed in this way, the issue becomes one of determining
whether the Federal Constitution supplants the accepted state
hierarchy of curricular decision making and bestows upon the
classroom teacher the right to make certain curricular decisions
contrary to the wishes of superiors, or otherwise to invalidate
certain types of curricular decisions made by the school authorities in the cases under consideration.
C. Inadequate Basesfor a Teacher's ConstitutionalRight
to Teach Contrary to Preferences of Superiors

1. Professionalism
Among the bases that have been proposed to support a
teacher's constitutional right to make curricular decisions contrary to the wishes of superiors is that of professionalism. For
example, the plaintiff teacher in Parducci cited her "professional
obligation" as the basis for her refusal to abide by the directives
of the superior school authorities. 13 1 The American Civil Liberties Union has stated:
The professional staff, by virtue of its training and
experience, has the right and responsibility to establish
the curriculum, subject to the approval of boards of
education and state departments of education. It is expected that members of the staff will be guided at all
times by the highest professional standards of scholarship and methodology, applied with an appropriate
sensitivity to the community's educational needs and the
expressed views of its citizens. Their professional preparation, however, qualifies them to establish what shall
be included in the curriculum and when and how it
shall be taught, free from 32dictation by community
groups or individual citizens.'

Professionalism has also been invoked by Professor Robert
O'Neil, in an article sharply critical of Presidents Council, as a
131

316 F. Supp. at 354.

2

13 AMERICAN
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justification for a librarian's right of book selection contrary to
the wishes of the school board. 33 Finally, professionalism appears to be a central aspect of the Mailloux district court's understanding of Keefe and Parducci as upholding curricular decisions
of teachers over those of superior school authorities if the decisions are shown to be regarded by the weight of opinion in the
134
profession as permissible.
Those arguing that teachers' professionalism should entitle
them to control their own work product have compared teachers
to physicians and attorneys. 1 35 There is, of course, considerable
force to the argument that individual professionals-people who
have acquired a unique and valuable skill or body of
knowledge-should be, and are, generally allowed considerable
discretion in determining how to perform their tasks and even in
defining the tasks to be performed. Our society usually recognizes that to do otherwise would be counterproductive in terms
of obtaining the best work product from professionals. Additionally, views of professional associations or the prevailing standards in a profession are often accorded great weight in determinations concerning that profession. For example, the district
court's use in Mailloux of the weight of professional opinion as a
standard for evaluating proper teacher conduct finds a strong
parallel in the common law use of prevailing professional standards in determining whether an attorney or a physician has
violated the standard of care required of him by the law of
36

torts.1

Using professionalism to support a constitutional right of
teacher control of curriculum creates many difficulties, however, even assuming that teachers are "professionals" in the same
sense as physicians and attorneys. First, and most significantly,
these examples of general societal and legal deference to professional opinion involve policy choices, not constitutional commands. It could hardly be suggested that it would be unconstitutional for a state to decide that the tort standard of care it
requires of physicians is higher or otherwise different than the
standard prevailing in the profession. Indeed, the Supreme
133 O'Neil, supra note 4, at 246-47.
134 323 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
135
Jones, supra note 26, at 224, 233. Note that this argument is made in the context
of a discussion
of university professors, not teachers in lower education.
36
1 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161-64 (4th ed.
1971).

19761

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SCHOOL TEACHERS

Court has recently held that even in the area of freedom of the
press, an area at the heart of constitutional concern, the Constitution does not require legal deference to the professional
standards of journalists concerning the nondisclosure of the
137
source of confidential information.
Moreover, even as a policy matter, professionalism is not
persuasive as a basis for a doctrine of teacher control of curriculum. The arguments supporting such a view usually attempt
to assimilate a teacher to the archetypal professional, such as a
physician, attorney, or artist. Such arguments, however, generally fail to note that the archetypal professional is an independent contractor who sells his skills or work product to clients on
the open market. This, of course, is not true of public school
teachers, who are dependent on the government for their
salaries. In seeking the right to determine what they teach within
this context, public school teachers do not set forth the typical
laissez-faire contention that one should be free to sell his goods
or services in the open market without undue restraints; they
advance the extraordinary contention that teachers should be
free of the usual obligations of employees to their employers.
Even when archetypal professionals serve as salaried employees,
the type of work they do, and to some extent the method and
manner of its performance, may well be regulated by their employers. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, even the forceful
statement of the American Civil Liberties Union supporting
teacher control of curriculum on the ground of professionalism
makes such teacher control "subject to the approval of boards of
8
13
education and state departments of education.'

Finally, one must be very careful in deciding precisely what
kinds of decisions a professional's unique training and experience qualify him to determine. Presumably the special training
and experience of a teacher have equipped him to decide issues
of pedogogical methodology. But issues of what should be
taught, as distinguished from those concerning how to teach,
may involve completely different kinds of considerations. For
example, important value judgments concerning the proper allocation of societal resources or the aims sought to be accomplished by public education may be relevant. Suchjudgments are
not of the type which the prior training and experience of
137 Branzburg
138

v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
supra note 132, at 7.
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teachers have uniquely equipped them to answer definitively
for society, either as individual teachers or as an organized faculty or profession. These are truly political questions that should
be determined by instruments of societal will rather than by pro39
fessional experts.
The fact that the majority of local school boards in this
country is elected by the voters reflects the political nature of
much of educational decision making. 14 " The political nature of
curricular decision making is further evidenced by the fact that,
in contrast to the cases and commentators discussed above that
42
4
support a teacher's right to determine curriculum,1 ' courts
139 Of course, teachers are members of society who may, individually or collectively,
contribute to the determination of the societal will in such matters.
properly
40
1 See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
141 See text accompanying notes 74-96, 109-13 supra; Van Alstyne, Constitutional
Rights, supra note 4; Nahmod, supra note 4.
142 Board of Educ. v. Rockaway Township Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.J. Super. 564, 295
A.2d 380 (1972); cf. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d
526 (1972); Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App.2d 456, 222
N.E.2d 243 (1966). See generally S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 746-801. This position
was well expressed by the New Jersey Superior Court in Board of Educ. v. Rockaway
Township Educ. Ass'n, supra, in which the court held that a provision of a teacher collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of grievances could not be applied
to curricular determinations:
The selection of courses to be presented to students and the subjects to be
presented or discussed cannot be a "term or condition of employment." Defendants argue "there can be no doubt that the methods of selecting courses
and even more clearly, the procedures and methods by which these courses are
to be presented, may be negotiated at least in broad terms." This proposition is
untenable.
The Board is responsible for the production of a "thorough and efficient"
school system (N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § IV, par. 1) and particularly the
statutory obligation to provide "courses of study suited to the ages and attainments of all pupils." N.J.S.A. 18A:33-1. The Board has a continuing obligation
placed upon it by the Legislature to adopt and alter courses of study.
120 N.J. Super. at 569-70, 295 A.2d at 383-84.
Quoting from a decision by the Commissioner of Education, the court in Rockaway
made clear that the New Jersey school law gave the local boards management of the
public schools. According to the Commissioner, local boards are able and expected to
look to teachers for professional input into the decision making process; however, the
board is not obligated to follow teacher suggestions in its ultimate determinations.
Teachers, far from being a special interest class with regard to the operation of public
schools, are, as forcefully stated in Porcelli v. Titus, 108 N.J. Super. 301, 312, 261 A.2d
364, 370 (App. Div. 1970), cert. denied, 55 N.J. 310, 261 A.2d 355 (1969), merely employees who run the schools for the benefit of pupils, parents, and the community.
Therefore, according to the Rockaway court, the board cannot make certain issues subject to bargaining, let alone be forced to do so:
The courts have recognized that public employees cannot make contracts
with public agencies that are contrary to the dictates of the Legislature. Nor
can public agencies such as a board of education "abdicate or bargain away
their continuing legislative or executive obligation or discretion."
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and commentators 43 have been most reluctant to permit curricular decisions to become the subject of collective bargaining
between school boards and teachers' associations even when the
school board so desires.
Yet, as the cases discussed above illustrate, the arguments
for a constitutional right of teacher control of curriculum, or
more generally, a policy doctrine of academic freedom, are not
limited to nonpolitical issues of methodology. 144 Rather they are
concerned with issues that require difficult judgments as to the
kind of education and educational environment a community
desires. With regard to such issues, professionalism is an insufficient basis for a doctrine of teacher supremacy over the authorized, societal decision making structure.
2. Freedom of Expression
Professor Thomas Emerson offers a different justification
for academic freedom in the chapter entitled "Academic Freedom" of his book, The System of Freedom of Expression. 4 5 As the
It is concluded, therefore, that if the contract is read to delegate to a
teacher or to a teacher's union the subject of courses of study, the contract in
that respect is ultra vires and unenforceable.
120 N.J.
Super. at 570, 295 A.2d at 384 (citations omitted).
43
1

See H.

WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 7-32, 59-65,

137-53 (1971); Goldstein, Book Commentary: The Unions and the Cities, 22 BUFFALO L. Rav.
603 (1972); Hazard, Collective Bargaining and School Governance, 5 Sw. U.L. REv. 83
(1973). It is startling that the issue of delegation of school board authority over curricular decisions which so disturbs the courts and commentators cited in this and the preceding footnote are never discussed by the cases supporting a constitutional right of
teachers to determine what they teach. Apparently, despite the reference to individual
teachers in Board of Educ. v. Rockaway Township Educ. Ass'n, 120 N.J. Super. 564,
570, 295 A.2d 380, 384 (1972), the issue of delegation of school board powers to
teachers is generally perceived only when the situation involves teachers as a group
rather than as individuals. Only then are teachers seen as competing with other groups,
such as parents, students and community organizations, for educational decision making power. Yet, the problem of giving preferred status to teachers in this competition
clearly applies to situations in which teachers are acting as individuals as well as in a
group. See also note 94 supra.
Arguments for teacher control of curriculum based on professionalism sometime
refer to the individual "professional" teacher, but at other times to larger groups, up to
and including the entire "profession."
144 This is not to imply that there is any basis for a constitutional right of teachers
to determine pedagogical methods, even if methodology can be distinguished from curriculum in a policy sense. In many cases what is taught is indistinguishable from how it
is taught. For example, a choice to use a textbook depicting the founding fathers in an
extremely favorable light might be inconsistent with a teacher's desire to use the Socratic method, a pedagogical device. Cf. Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th
Cir. 1972).
"

T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 593.
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title of the book suggests, Professor Emerson attempts to justify
individual teacher control of the classroom as an aspect of freedom of expression protected by the first amendment. Both the
Keefe and Parducci courts apparently considered their substantive
holdings to be applications of the first amendment to the situation of public schools. Yet Professor Emerson is troubled by the
complications involved in applying concepts of freedom of expression to a public school teacher's decisions of what and how to
teach. 146 The district court in Mailloux was equally troubled by
this problem and resorted to saying that academic freedom "is
akin to, and may indeed be a species of, the right to freedom of
speech which is embraced by the concept of the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth Amndment [sic]. Analytically, as
distinguished from rhetorically, it is less a right than a
constitutionally-recognized interest."' 4 7 The meaning of this
statement is quite obscure. What is clear, however, is the reluctance of the court to accept academic freedom as simply an aspect of freedom of expression protected by the first amendment.
This reluctance is well founded. As stressed above, 4 8 the
traditional construct to which the first amendment has been applied is that of the government's attempting to restrain or censor
the speech of its citizens. It has not generally been applied to a
governmental or nongovernmental employer's attempting to
control the work product of its employees, as employers normally do, merely because that work product happens to be
speech or expression. Indeed, no one would suggest that a governmental employee, such as a clerk in a government office,
could not be directed by his superiors to respond to citizens'
questions in a certain manner, despite the fact that his responses
would consist of speech.
The extraordinary nature of claims for teacher control of
curriculum, based on the assertion that teaching consists of expression, can be seen quite clearly when academic freedom is
compared with freedom of the press, a central first amendment
concern. Academic freedom claims, unlike those of freedom of
the press, demand subsidized speech. They are claims to be
hired and retained on a public school payroll in order to engage
1461d. 616.
147 Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 n.4 (D. Mass.), affd, 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir.
1971).
48
' See text accompanying notes 95, 130 supra.
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in speech (consisting of teaching) free from normal employment
restraints on work product. No such claims have been vindicated
49
for freedom of the press.1

Rather, freedom of the press consists of the negative right to
be free from governmental restraints if the economic or other
means necessary to publish one's thoughts are available. Freedom of the press is essentially the freedom of the publisher, not
the staff writer or editor. It would not appear to violate freedom
of the press for a publisher to fire writers and editors with whom
he disagrees.' 50 Indeed, not only does freedom of the press not
include a right to subsidized speech, but, as recently held by the
Supreme Court, freedom of the press is actually violated by a
state law that requires newspapers to grant a political candidate
equal space to answer attacks on him by the newspaper.' 5 '
Thus, the concept of freedom of expression cannot, on
the ground that teaching consists of spoken and written words,
support teacher control of curriculum. Indeed, Professor Emerson 152 and other writers

53

recognize this fact and ultimately

base their positions not on the simple fact that teaching consists
of expression or speech, but rather that it consists of a special
kind of speech that is inherent in the concepts of teaching or
education.
The theoretical basis for the doctrine of academic freedom
of classroom teaching has generally been developed in the context of higher education. Because traditionally academic freedom has been spoken and written of in terms of higher education, the doctrine has developed on premises that are thought to
be inherent in the concepts of teaching and academic research at
the university level. A full development of the premises of
academic freedom of teaching and research at the university
49 A confused exception to this statement appears to exist in a number of lower
court cases concerning the rights of student editors of university newspapers. See, e.g.,
Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d
108, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1973). But cf. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970). See also Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). The cases are conflicting, however, and the rationale for supporting the right of
editors to subsidized speech is not convincing. See S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at
383-414.
150
But see note 149 sitpra.
'5' Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). But see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
152T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 618-26.
"' See, e.g., Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalRights, supra note 4; Nahmod, supra note 4.
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level is beyond the confines of this Article. 15 4 A brief investigation is necessary, however, because the development of those
concepts in higher education has come to influence the views of
courts and commentators concerning teacher control of curriculum in lower education.
The basic premise underlying the doctrine of academic
freedom of teaching and research at the university level is that
truth is discovered through research and inquiry, that there are
no revealed truths or dogmas that are not subject to question
through research. Equally important is the concept that the
function of education is to open the minds of the students, a
function best accomplished by bombarding students with all conceivable ideas, from which they may discern truth, if it exists, by
and for themselves. Indeed, in the analytic model of education
previously described, 5 5 the student, even while still a student, is
a participant in this search for truth. Any restriction on the ideas
that may be communicated to students, therefore, is an impermissible restriction on their right to learn. Under this concept, as
stated by Justice Brennan in Keyishian, "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' . . . [in which occurs a] robust

exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.' "156
The problems with such a premise for a constitutional or
policy norm of academic freedom in higher education are
beyond the scope of this Article, 15 7 but it is clear that the premises which underlie academic freedom in higher education
have not historically been compatible with the American concept
of lower education. The major difference between the university
and secondary school situations was well stated by the district
court in Mailloux in that portion of its opinion explaining its
refusal to extend the academic freedom doctrines of Keefe and
Parducci.158

The central fact in the distinction between higher and lower
154 My views on this subject have been developed in my recent article, Academic
Freedom: Its Meaning and Underlying Premises as Seen Through the American Experience.
Goldstein, supra note 4.
...
See text accompanying note 17 supra.
116Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
15"For a discussion of this issue, see Goldstein, supra note 4.
1S8323 F. Supp. at 1392.
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education is the role of value inculcation in the teaching process.
The public schools in the United States traditionally have viewed
instilling the young with societal values as a significant part of
the schools' educational mission. 159 Such a mission is directly
opposed to the vision of education that underlies the premises of
academic freedom in higher education. If the purpose of teaching is to instill values, there would seem to be little reason for the
teacher, rather than an elected school board or other governmental body ultimately responsible to the public, to be the one
who chooses the values to be instilled.
Thus, in order to support teacher control of curriculum as a
constitutional norm, one must argue that the market place of
ideas vision of education espoused in Keyishian, rather than one
focusing on value inculcation, is constitutionally required for
lower public education in the United States. Before entering into
a discussion of such arguments,'61

"

however, it is necessary to

explore further the concepts underlying a construct of education
that does not accept value inculcation as a legitimate part of its
function, because the problems of value inculcation intrude into
the process even if one does not accept them as a legitimate part
of education.
A true market place of ideas should be totally free, and
ideally no limits should be placed on those who have the opportunity to expose their ideas to students. Obviously, however, only
a limited number of people may be employed as teachers by a
public school. In order to try to obviate this fundamental difficulty with the free market concept, students may be exposed to
outside lecturers and encouraged to join in the educational process themselves by developing their own means of expression
through, for example, student newspapers. Yet, these additional
elements cannot change the fact that only certain people are
employed to teach and evaluate the students, thus giving them a
unique position in the market place. Moreover, the conflict between this unique position of teachers and the ideal of the market place is much more pronounced at the secondary school level
than it is at the university level.
This difference is caused by the nature of the students, the
teachers, and the institutions. The students in public high

"'See
text accompanying
6
'

notes 185-89 infra.
See text accompanying notes 185-207 infra.
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schools, as noted by the district court in Mailloux,' 6 ' are generally
less mature than their university counterparts. In Tilton v.
Richardson,'62 the plurality opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger relied on the difference in impressionability and
susceptability' 6 3 to indoctrination between lower education and
college students in holding that governmental grants to sectarian
colleges were constitutional even though those to sectarian lower
schools were not.
Moreover, while one might question the validity of the district court's comments in Mailloux concerning the lesser intellectual qualifications, experience, and emotional maturity of public
64
school teachers as compared to their university counterparts,
university professors probably do feel greater professional restraints imposed on their teaching by their disciplines than are
felt by public school teachers.
Finally, the nature of the two types of institutions differs. As
noted by the district court in Mailloux, "it cannot be accepted as a
premise that the [public school] student is voluntarily in the
classroom .... A secondary school student, unlike most college
students, is usually required to attend school classes, and may
have no choice as to his teacher."' 65 In contrast, a college student
often has considerable choice regarding the college he attends,
his courses, and his teachers. The much larger faculty of colleges, as compared to those of high schools, and the prevailing
system of electives, allows colleges to mitigate the problem of the
teacher's unique position in the market place by purposely hiring
professors in the same field who have conflicting views.' 66
Advocates of public school teacher control of classroom curriculum decisions have recognized and attempted to resolve the
inconsistancy of the teacher's position as an authority figure and
the ideal of education on which their system is based. Professor
Sheldon H. Nahmod, for example, would restrict teacher control
of curriculum by, among other things, requiring a "balanced"

1'323

F. Supp. at 1392.

162403 U.S. 672 (1971).
I 3 1d. at 686.
164 323 F. Supp. at 1392.

16 5 Id.
166 These distinctions between colleges and high schools are, of course, premised on
archetypes of each. In reality, colleges, and to a lesser extent high schools, vary among
themselves on many of these points, with some aspects of "higher education" more
closely approaching a high school situation than others.
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presentation. 6 7 In this manner he seeks to effectuate what he
recognizes as the state's interest in preventing "the indoctrinating effect which a teacher's one-sided presentation is thought to
have on his students who are, in a real sense, his captive
audience."' 68 Professor Nahmod's commitment to teacher control of curriculum, however, leads him to conclude that after a
teacher has made a balanced presentation he has a constitutional
69
right to express his own opinion on the subject.'
There are substantial difficulties with Nahmod's resolution
of the conflict between the market place of ideas concept and the
authority figures status of the teacher. First, in practice it would
seem quite difficult to separate a teacher's balanced presentation
from his subsequent assertion of his own opinions, and it is not
clear why this subsequent assertion of opinion would not often
cancel out the effect of the previous balanced presentation. More
fundamentally, there is a serious question whether teaching, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, can be balanced or
neutral. In recent years, so-called radical historians have argued
forcefully that in the field of history traditional scholarship has
been neither balanced nor neutral, nor what one might call objective.
Moreover, the concept of the balanced presentation has no
meaning when the argument is that certain material should not
be presented at all because the mere exposure of the students in
school to the material is not educationally sound. This, in fact,
was the argument of the school authorities in Keefe, Parducci,
Mailloux, Presidents Council, and perhaps Epperson; all cases in
which the school authorities did not want the students exposed
in school to the language or the ideas involved in the assigned
readings or classroom discussion. A balanced discussion of such
language or ideas would not have met these concerns. Nor can it
be concluded, a priori, that the problem of the authority figure
status of the teacher is not relevant when the issue is pure exposure. The mere presentation of language or ideas by a teacher
under the auspices of the school may give an appearance of
legitimacy to the use of such language or ideas, which is precisely
what the authorities wish to prevent. Indeed, a failure to understand the desire of school authorities to prevent the legitimiza167

Nahmod, supra note 4, at 1042-50.

161Id.
169

1048.

Id.1049.
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tion of language usage or ideas that may occur through their
mere presentation in school, may result in the non sequitur
argument that the school has no real interest in preventing the
use of "street language" in school, because the students
are
170
probably already familiar with the words from the street.
A more radical attempt to resolve this conflict between the
market place ideal and the authority position of the teacher was
made by Professor William Van Alstyne 17 1 in his discussion of
Justice Black's concurring opinion in Epperson. 72 While recognizing that there are many groups which arguably should have
input into curricular decisions, Van Alstyne realizes that someone must have the power to make the final decision, and he
believes that the legislature or school board are the most logical
choices because they are democratically constituted, politically
responsible, and subject to constitutional constraints. Van Alstyne rejects the view that the classroom is a completely free and
voluntary public forum in which "the remunerated teacher may
appropriately assert the same full measure of his own freedom
of speech available to him as a citizen in private life.

'173

Citing

the compulsory nature of classroom attendance, the inability of
students to offer dissenting views for fear of teacher sanctions,
and the role of the teacher as employee, Van Alstyne strongly
questions both the existence and wisdom of complete freedom
for teachers:
[The teacher] is insulated within his classroom even
from the immediate competition of different views held
by others equally steeped in the same academic discipline. Indeed, the use of his classroom by a teacher or
professor deliberately to proselytize for a personal cause
or knowingly to emphasize only that selection of data
best conforming to his own personal biases is far
beyond the license granted by the freedom of speech
and furnishes precisely
the just occasion to question his
74
fitness to teach.1

Van Alstyne then notes that the above factors that support
limiting teacher freedom
See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (lst Cir. 1969).
Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalRights, supra note 4, at 855-58.
See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
"'
Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalRights, supra note 4,at 856.
17 4
170

171

172

1d.
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apply with equal force when the prescription for biased
treatment of a given subject or the mandate to use the
classroom as an instrument of ideological proselytism is
fashioned by a legislature or a school board instead-a
legislature or school board that so rigidly determines
the exact and preselected details of each course that in
fact it employs the teacher as a mere mechanical instrument of its impermissible design. For instance, it
may be relatively unimportant that Commager's high
school text on American history is uniformly purchased
in bulk and prescribed as the basic text in high schools
civics in lieu of a similar text by Jones or Smith unless its
particular selection plus detailed proscriptions of any
classroom reference to other texts, other impressions,
and other historical ideas cumulatively combine to describe a process of unfree education and academic indoctrination. Indeed, arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of information or opinion, resulting not
from understandable budgetary constraints or the restraints upon the time available for study by teachers
and students, are precisely what the first amendment
disallows. Against a school board decree requiring the
inculcation of one theory and forbidding mention or
examination of another, for instance, a mere taxpayer
should have standing to contest his compelled financial
support for the propagation of ideas to which he is
opposed .

. .

. Correspondingly, neither must teachers

or professors endure similarly arbitrary restrictions in
the course of their own inquiries or upon their own communicated classroom references. One may not, as a condi-

tion of his employment, be made an implement of governmental practices which
are themselves violative of
175
the first amendment.

Superficially, Professor Van Alstyne's theory might seem to
be another argument for the academic freedom of teachers to
make curricular choices. This appearance is strengthened by the
title of the article from which the above quotation is taken, The
Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, and the general

tenor of the remainder of the article. The impression is further
reinforced by the fact that in all the cases under discussion,
175

Id. 856-57.
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Professor Van Alstyne's theory leads him to support the
teacher's right in the same manner as do the advocates of the
constitutional right of teachers to control their classroom teaching.
Yet this appearance is truly only superficial. Professor Van
Alstyne's theory does not depend at all on a right of teachers to,
decide what they teach. Rather, it is based on the concept that all
curricular decision makers, including teachers, state legislatures,
school boards, and school administrators, are precluded by the
Constitution from making certain types of curricular decisions.
The fact that such a theory may generally be viewed as supporting teachers' rights is based on the preconception that it is usually the other types of curricular decision makers that make the
kinds of curricular decisions that Professor Van Alstyne believes
are constitutionally objectionable.
Indeed, the full ramifications of this approach are not completely analyzed by Professor Van Alstyne himself. He discusses
a teacher's imposition of his orthodoxy on his students as forbidden in terms of its providing a constitutionally legitimate basis
for the school authorities to take action against the teacher. The
full implications of his argument, however, go much further.
Impermissible teacher curricular decision making, like impermissible legislative or school board curricular decision making,
not only justifies school-authority action to counter it, but is itself
unconstitutional, and therefore justifies judicial relief at the request of taxpayers or citizens, as Professor Van Alstyne himself
argues in relation to school board or legislative action.
These implications may be illustrated by the following examples. The Supreme Court has held that ceremonial Bible
reading authorized by the legislature is unconstitutional as violative of the first amendment's establishment clause. 7 6 Pursuant to
both the logic of the Supreme Court opinion and Professor Van
Alstyne's argument, ceremonial Bible reading decided upon by
an individual classroom teacher would be equally unconstitutional on the same ground. 7 It would also appear, again both
by the logic of the Epperson opinion 1 78 and the Van Alstyne
theory, that a teacher's refusal to teach evolution based on his
176School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
'

77

178

See generally S. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 355-64.
See text accompanying notes 53-73 supra.
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religious convictions would be as unconstitutional as the Arkansas statute invalidated in Epperson.'7 9
The essence of the Van Alstyne approach, therefore, is not
directed at determining who is the decision maker, but rather
what kinds of curricular decisions are constitutionally prohibited
to all decision makers. One can easily agree that such decisions
include those that violate a specific constitutional prohibition
such as the establishment of religion clause, although one may
doubt thatEpperson is really such a case. 180 Also one could accept
the proposition that truly arbitrary curricular decisions are constitutionally prohibited, although other than an example such as
Justice Stewart's in which the mentioning of the existence of
other languages besides Spanish is forbidden, 181 it is difficult to
conceive of any cases that would belong in this category. Surely,
Epperson does not, and the absurdity of Justice Stewart's example
indicates that probably no real-life examples do fall within the
1 82
category of truly arbitrary curricular decisions.
When Professor Van Alstyne, however, uses the term "arbitrary restrictions," he apparently does not mean truly "arbitrary" in the sense of having no basis in reason, but rather, as is
often the case in the use of this term, having no reasonable
relationship to what he considers the legitimate ends of curricular decision making. Under the Van Alstyne view such legitimate ends apparently do not include value inculcation or "in83
doctrination."'
179 Note that although this proposition correctly follows from Epperson and the Van
Alstyne theory alone, the first amendment free exercise rights of the teacher not to
teach180evolution might, as an outside factor, change this result.
See note 57 supra.
181 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 116 (1968) (concurring opinion).

...
See notes 70-73 supra & accompanying text.

The Van Alstyne argument becomes somewhat confused at this point by his
ambiguous statement that "arbitrary restrictions [imposed by school authorities superior
to teachers] on alternative sources of information or opinion, resulting not from understandable budgetary constraints or the restraints upon the time available for study by
teachers and students, are precisely what the first amendment disallows." Van Alstyne,
Constitutional Rights, supra note 4, at 857. The basic problem with this statement is the
possibility that it is drawing a dichotomy between "arbitrary restrictions" and budgetary
or time constraints. That no such dichotomy can be drawn, however, is clear. Budgetary
or time constraints generally do not dictate choices; rather they require the making of
choices, which are in turn based on other, more substantive, factors related to the goals
sought to be achieved within the time and budgetary constraints.
Reading the term "arbitrary restrictions" in the above quoted sentence to mean
"indoctrination," thus permitting higher school authorities to make all kinds of other
substantive curricular decisions, would be consistent with the rest of the Van Alstyne
183

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:1293

3.

Market Place of Ideas Model Not
Constitutionally Compelled
Thus, both the teacher control of curriculum theory and the
Van Alstyne theory depend ultimately on the view that the federal constitution compels the states to accept a market place of
ideas model rather than a value inculcation model of public education.18 4 Yet, such a constitutional doctrine is at clear variance
with the historically accepted societal view that the deliberate
inculcation of the right societal values is a major function of
American public education. This has been evident in the United
States since 1647, the year in which the first education act in the
American colonies was passed. The Massachusetts Education Act
thesis. The sentence can also be read, however, as prohibiting higher school authorities
from placing negative restrictions on teachers except for reasons of time and budget.
Such a reading apparently would give to teachers a constitutional right of curricular
determination, at least in terms of an affirmative right to teach material disapproved by
superiors. Yet, such a right of teacher control of curriculum is not supported by the
reasoning of the Van Alstyne thesis.
Alternatively, the sentence might be read to suggest a right of all curricular decision makers, including the classroom teacher, to make determinations in favor of
specific teaching material. Thus, if any possible curricular decision maker decided that
certain material should be taught, no other decision maker could overrule that aleciion,
except for reasons of budget and time. Such a position would be quite consistent with
an extreme view of the market place of ideas ideal of education. Yet, it does not seem
likely that Van Alstyne was espousing it. As noted above, the essence of his position is
that of anti-indoctrination, not anti-educational decision making by superior school authorities, and it is clear that he favors the politically responsible baord as the primary
decision maker. All curricular decisions are necessarily bounded by budget and time
considerations since both are finite. The essence of curricular decision making is the
making of value judgments within those constraints. As long as these value judgments
do not include attempts at value inculcation or indoctrination, it would seem that Van
Alstyne would not object, as a constitutional matter at least.
Finally, there is one further possible reading of the sentence in question. This reading would emphasize the wording "arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of information or opinion" (emphasis supplied). That is, what is forbidden to superior school
authorities is to order the teaching of one view of a subject while prohibiting the teaching of contrary positions on that same subject. Such a prohibition would be viewed as a
clear instance of attempted indoctrination. Such a limited reading of the sentence is
consistent with the rest of the Van Alstyne thesis and also with Van Alstyne's depiction
of indoctrination as the combination of ordering the teaching of one view of a subject
while proscribing other views. Indeed, one might conclude that, to Van Alstyne, this
was the only situation to which his doctrine was applicable. That this is not true, however, is seen by the fact that Van Alstyne is using his doctrine to answer Justice Black's
concurrence in Epperson and to support the Epperson result on a basis other than that of
the establishment clause. Epperson was not a situation where the legislature ordered the
teaching of the origin of man but prohibited the teaching of Darwinism. Where the
Arkansas law was being observed, it was likely that the whole subject of the origin of
man was
not being taught.
"84 See generally text accompanying note 17.
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of 1647185 explicitly sets forth its purpose to thwart "Satan" by
teaching children to read the Bible and to educate the youth "not
only in good literature, but in sound doctrine.' 18 6 This vision of
public education has continued over the years, though the views
of what is "sound doctrine" may have varied from time to time
and place to place. 87 This fact was recognized by the Supreme
Court in the well-known case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 8 in which the Court, while holding unconstitutional a state-required compulsory flag salute, contrasted the
flag salute with the constitutionally valid route to accomplishing
the same end of "inspir[ing] patriotism and love of country"
189
through "teaching by instruction and study."'
Thus, no sound theoretical basis exists for the view that the
Constitution precludes value inculcation as a function of public
education. Yet, the supporters of this view are not entirely without precedent for their position. The precedent relied upon by
both Professor Nahmod and Professor Van Alstyne is the wellknown case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,190 discussed above,' 9 ' in which the Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional for a local school board to have prohibited the wearing of black arm bands to school by students on
a Vietnam War moritorium day. This reliance on Tinker is not
the superficial reliance of Parducci on the inapplicable disruption test. Rather Tinker is said to support the proposition fundamental to the views of Nahmod and Van Alstyne-that the

185

CHARTERS & LAws OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY,

Ch. 88, §§ 1-2 (1814) (originally

enacted in 1647).
'86Id. § 3 (originally enacted in 1671).
187 Se generally, e.g., B. BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1972); L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 1607-1783
(1970); L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF'THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN

EDUCATION 1876-1957 (1962); J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY & EDUCATION (1966); J. DEWEY
& E. DEWEY, SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW (1962 ed.); I. ILLICH, AFTER DESCHOOLING,
WHAT? (A. Gartner, C. Greer & F. Riessman eds. 1973); I. ILLICH, DESCHOOLING
SOCIETY (1972); Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 4 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 60-65

(Fed. ed. 1904).
188 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
189 Id. at 631 (quoting with approval the dissent of Chief Justice Stone in Miners-

ville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940)). See also James v. Board of Educ.,
461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) ("a principal function of
all elementary and secondary education is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the
ABC's or multiplication tables or to transmit the basic values of the community").

190 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

xm1See text accompanying notes 97-104 supra.
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Constitution requires the adoption of the market place of ideas
model of public school education.
The following language from the opinion of the Court, written by Justice Fortas, is relevant here:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are "persons" under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect, just as they themselves
must respect their obligations to the State. In our system,
students may not be regardedas closed-circuitrecipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views.192
This language in Tinker may be seen as an adoption by the
Supreme Court of the "analytic model," of the "analytic"-"prescriptive" dichotomy discussed above,' 93 as a constitutional requirement of public school education in the United
States.'94 In a similar vein, Professor Nahmod has read Tinker as
holding that a public high school is constitutionally required to
be an "educational public forum.' 9 5 Professor Nahmod has explicitly invoked his interpretation of Tinker as major support for
the correctness of the substantive holdings of Keefe and Parducci
and his view that teachers have a constitutional right to teach
what they desire in the classroom, subject only to limitations
concerning relevance and balance:
The student interest in learning, and thus in access
to classroom discussion of controversial subjects may be
analogized to a college student's right to hear controversial speakers on campus-a right which recent decisions have consistently held may not be regulated arbitrarily. Such an interest in receiving information was
192 393
193

U.S. at 511 (emphasis supplied).

See text accompanying note 17 supra.
191Goldstein, supra note 17, at 614-15.
195Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5
HARV. Civ. RiGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 278, 294 (1970).
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couched in first amendment terms in Lamont v. Postmaster General'9 6 where the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute requiring the Postmaster
General to deliver unsealed foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda" only upon the addressee's
request. The majority determined that the statute imposed an affirmative obligation on addresses amounting
to an unconstitutional burden on their first amendment
rights. In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and
Goldberg reasoned that the first amendment includes
those fundamental personal rights necessary to make it
meaningful. "[T]he right to receive publications is such
a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are
not free to receive and consider them. It would be a
barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers."
It is true that Lamont and the cases on controversial
campus speakers involve adults or college students who
are generally more mature than high school students.
Moreover, a high school classroom would seem to be a
more controlled and restricted marketplace of ideas
than the mails or college campuses, if only because of
compulsory attendance and, frequently, a uniformly required curriculum. Nevertheless, after Tinker, it is clear
that students cannot be insulatedfrom controversial subjects in
school. If this applies to student expression through
worn symbols, underground newspapers, and even
school newspapers, then it would seem both inconsistent
and educationally unworkable to prohibit student access
to controversial subjects through supervised classroom
97
presentations.1
Yet even if Professor Nahmod's views of Tinker are valid, his
conclusion that "it would seem both inconsistent and educationally unworkable" to draw distinctions between student input into
196 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
197 Nahmod, supra note 4, at 1055 (emphasis supplied). See also Justice Douglas'
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Presidents Council v. Community School Bd.,
409 U.S. 998 (1972): "Are we sending children to school to be educated by the norms
ot the School Board or are we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past,
to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world's problems?" Id. at
999-1000.
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the educational process-the context of Tinker and the commentaries on it-and teacher control of curriculum seems questionable. For the reasons discussed above regarding the authority
position of the teacher, 198 one might well conclude that a constitutional requirement that students be permitted to exploit the
captive audience status of their fellow students by exposing them
to their opinions is more acceptable than a constitutional requirement that teachers be permitted to do so.
There are, however, additional reasons to reject the view
that Tinker controls the result in the teacher control of curriculum cases. The Tinker opinion may well reflect Justice Fortas'
impatience with a prescriptive (as contrasted with analytic) model
of education' 9 9 and, indeed, the opinion is most internally consistent and logically satisfying when viewed as based on pedagogical doctrines similar to the marketplace of ideas model of education. Yet the first amendment does not contain such judgments.
As demonstrated above,
even if the marketplace of ideas
model is deisrable from a policy standpoint, Barnette suggests
that value inculcation is a constitutionally valid approach to public education. Thus it should not be a matter of first amendment
concern if a school system were to determine that it wanted to
control, as far as possible, all inputs into a student's learning
process while he is in school and therefore did not want the
students to be active participants in the process. Nor would it
seem to be a matter of concern to any other section of the Constitution. Thus, a decision that Tinker rests on such a basis is a
decision that Tinker is wrong. If Tinker is a wrong decision, its
error should not be compounded by extending its doctrine to
the area of teacher control of curriculum.
One does not necessarily have to conclude, however, that
Tinker was wrongly decided to deny that it supports teacher control of curriculum. Tinker, on its facts, is similar to James, ° 1
which held it to be unconstitutional for school authorities to
prohibit the wearing of a black armband to school by a teacher
on a Vietnam War moratorium day.2 0 2 Unlike the Court in

98

See text accompanying notes 107-83 supra.
Goldstein, supra note 17, at 615.
200 See text accompanying notes 188-89 supra.
2"James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
202
See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
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Tinker,2 3 the court in James did not rely on a pedagogical model
to reach its result. To the contrary, it upheld the right of
teachers to assert their rights as citizens despite the fact that they
happened to be in school. °4 Similarly, the students in Tinker
could be viewed as citizens asserting their rights to wear black
armbands on the day that all citizens with their political viewpoints had planned to wear them, despite the fact that the students had to be in school at that time. Under this rationale,
students might be in an even stronger position than teachers as
they are compelled by law to attend school and do not have the
same authority-figure influence on their fellow students. 20 5
Moreover, statements in the opinion support such an
analysis of the case. The limitation of the Tinker doctrine to
student expression which does not materially disrupt the educational process is much more consistent with the view that the
student expression is an outside force intruding into the school
than with the view that it is an integral part of the educational
process itself.20 6 Reinforcing this idea is the Court's reference to
other cases involving outside demonstrations "disrupting" ongoing state activities, such as hospitals orjails. °7
Thus Tinker is not controlling in the teacher control of curriculum cases for several different reasons. First, even reading
Tinker as requiring a market place of ideas model of public education in terms of student participation in their own education,
teachers may be distinguished from students in this regard. Second, Tinker is not correct if it rests on such a model and its error
should not be compounded by extending it. Finally, Tinker can
be reanalyzed as resting on citizen's rights, thus making it irrelevant to the issue of teacher control of curriculum.
V.

CONCLUSION

Neither sound constitutional analysis nor authoritative precedent support a federal constitutional right of teachers to determine what they teach contrary to the desires of school authorities superior to teachers within the state-sanctioned chain of,
203

See text accompanying notes 190-92.

204 461 F.2d at 571-72.
205 Such a view of Tinker would, of course, greatly limit its precedential value for

other206issues of student rights in school.
Cf. text accompanying notes 97-104 supra.
207 393 U.S. at 512 n.6.
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command. The cases involving restrictions on teachers' rights of
curricular control are often erroneously viewed as censorship
cases when the real issue is who should make curricular choices
given the fact that someone has to make the choices. With regard
to this issue, the arguments that the Constitution allocates curricular decisionmaking authority to the teacher are not persuasive. Professionalism is rejected as a basis for such a right because, inter alia, teachers are not independent contractors but are
part of a conventional employer-employee relationship, and because the only supportive reasons are policy, not constitutional,
arguments. Likewise, the freedom of expression rationale does
not support a constitutional mandate of teacher curricular control. The freedom of expression justification for teacher control
is premised on an analytical model of education which views
school as a market place of ideas. There is no historical or precedential basis, however, for concluding that the market place of
ideas model is constitutionally compelled over the traditional
value inculcation model. Thus, in the final analysis, teachers'
constitutional rights, in and out of the classroom, do not extend
beyond the first amendment rights of all citizens.
It should be noted that this result does not seem undesirable
as a matter of general policy. Although teachers' professional
training and experience may give them special competency in
matters of pedagogical methodology, often curricular decisions
involve important value judgments concerning the proper allocation of societal resources or the aims sought to be accomplished
by public education. These are ultimately political questions,
which the expertise of teachers does not provide any special
2 8
competency in answering. 0
Moreover, in a democratic society it would seem desirable
that politically responsive groups have the power to effect the
public will concerning the structure and content of public
education. 21'9 Traditionally, parental participation in the educa-

tional process has been favored; the norm of the elected school
board reflects this view. Allowing parents and community
groups, as well as teachers, to have input into educational decisions comports more closely with the societal desire for lay control of education than does the more autocratic teacher control
theory.
'" See text accompanying note 139 supra.
"" See note 94 supra.
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Of course, this does not and cannot mean that all the dayto-day curricular decisions that a classroom teacher makes can or
should be dictated by higher authorities. The issue is not
whether either the teachers or the board will make all decisions,
but only who will have the final say in case of conflict. As a
practical matter, higher authorities are unable to control all policy decisions. The teachers' daily presence in their classrooms
2 10
gives them significant power in the decision making process.
Furthermore, this teacher power in the decision making process
is augmented by collective bargaining. 21 1 Although some
teachers input into the educational process is certainly desirable,
it would not be sound policy to increase this presently substantial
power by adopting a constitutional right of teacher curricular
control. 12
210 Goldstein, Book Commentary: The Unions and the Cities, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 603,
606-07 (1972).
211 See id.
212 Note also that most of the cases discussed in this Article present fact situations
in which a "liberal" position taken by the teacher is challenged by the more "conservative" school authorities; a belief that as a matter of educational policy the teachers in
these particular cases are correct may influence one's conclusion about where final decision making authority should be vested. It is not at all clear, however, that teachers
generally take the "liberal" or educationally "progressive" position when conflicts with
higher authorities arise. In fact, giving final decision making authority to individual
teachers could make it much more difficult for educational reform to take place. Presently a new school board or an individual principal may be able to produce significant
changes in the policy of a school. Query whether this could be accomplished if each
individual teacher had a constitutional right to resist all intended reforms. In terms of
activity within the classroom, teachers in many situations are likely to have more of an
interest in the status quo than will other interest groups involved. Thus the recognition
of teacher control of curriculum as a constitutional right may impede rather than promote educational reform.

